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I. PROLOGUE
Until its recent decisions of Schaffer v. Weast 1 in November of 2005
and Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy 2 in
June of 2006, respectively, the United States Supreme Court had not
heard a special education case since 1999. 3 Now, the Court’s renewed
focus on special education legal disputes will likely increase the
attention paid to this burgeoning area of the law. However, along with
this heightened attention come greater limitations on the rights of parents
who have children with disabilities. In its Arlington decision, the
Supreme Court ended the protracted debate among the circuit courts
over the meaning of “costs” under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The Supreme Court
held that the IDEA does not entitle prevailing parents in an action
against a school district to recover expert witness fees as part of the
“costs” associated with the litigation. 4 In addressing Arlington, this
Comment adopts a contrary position to that of the Supreme Court and
argues that the majority wrongly decided the case. Not only does the
decision contradict the overarching purposes of the IDEA, but now
parents bringing an action on behalf of their child with a disability will
have to bear the financial burden of compensating experts. In addition,
Arlington will effectively deter many low-income parents from pursuing
litigation when they cannot fund an expert. This ruling is especially
problematic for parents of children with an Autism Spectrum Disorder
who, to successfully litigate an IDEA case, require experts to assess
1.
2.
3.
4.
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546 U.S. 49 (2005).
126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006).
See Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999).
See Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2457.
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whether the school district is providing an appropriate educational program
for their child.
II. INTRODUCTION
For Brian and Juliana Jaynes of Newport News, Virginia, receiving
the neurologist’s confirmation that their son, Stefan, was severely
autistic was just the beginning. 5
Before his second birthday, Stefan knew his colors and his address.
He could identify different flowers, and he maintained a vocabulary of
250 words or more. 6 However, after his second birthday he began to
significantly regress, losing the ability to recognize words he previously
knew. 7 When the pediatric neurologist diagnosed Stefan with autism, he
stressed to Brian and Juliana the importance of early behavioral intervention,
emphasizing that there is “a window of opportunity and that window of
opportunity is greatest between the age of discovery and as early as
possible.” 8
Stefan’s frantic parents took action immediately, obtaining a referral
for special education services from Newport News Public Schools. 9
Rather than placing Stefan in a program specifically tailored for autistic
children, the school district enrolled him in a special education preschool
for children with various disabilities. 10 Stefan was the only student with
autism in his class. 11 Newport developed an Individualized Education
Program (IEP) for Stefan but failed to implement it. 12 After the
Jayneses repeatedly contacted the school requesting that the IEP be
carried out, Newport held another meeting and, without explanation or
justification, revised the IEP, which reduced the speech and language
services Stefan would receive to one day a week. 13 However, Newport

5. Laurie Tarkan, Autism Therapy Is Called Effective, but Rare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 2002, at F1. For an explanation of autism, or Autism Spectrum Disorder, see
discussion infra Part III.A.
6. Brief of Appellees at 4, Jaynes v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 13 F. App’x 166
(4th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-2312(L), 00-2575).
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id.
9. Jaynes, 13 F. App’x at 169.
10. Id.; Tarkan, supra note 5.
11. Brief of Appellees, supra note 6, at 11.
12. Jaynes, 13 F. App’x at 169.
13. Id.; Brief of Appellees, supra note 6, at 14.

253

REED POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

4/22/2008 1:42:35 PM

still neglected to supply Stefan with the minimal services provided in the
revised IEP. 14
Following months of delays in carrying out the IEP, Stefan’s condition
substantially worsened.15 The neurologist informed the Jayneses that Stefan
was rapidly regressing and that if he did not receive appropriate behavioral
intervention, he might have to be institutionalized. 16 Stefan’s parents
heeded the neurologist’s advice by immediately removing him from the
public school’s program and placing him in a private Lovaas Applied
Behavioral Analysis (ABA) 17 program, which included forty hours a
week of intensive behavioral therapy. 18
After the Jayneses incurred over $100,000 in educational expenses
over the course of three emotionally testing years, they saw the return of
their son. 19 Stefan has dramatically improved in his language and social
skills and spends more time engaging in social interactions and less time
in his own silent, isolated world. 20 And, according to his father, the
behavioral therapy awakened his son’s personality, which was “truly a
miracle.” 21
The Jaynes’ relentless struggle with the Newport News School District
to secure appropriate behavioral therapy for their autistic son is not
unique. Rather, the controversy over whether children with an Autism
14. Brief of Appellees, supra note 6, at 9.
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id. at 13–14; Tarkan, supra note 5.
17. For a discussion on Applied Behavioral Analysis as an early intervention
strategy for children with autism, see infra note 69.
18. Jaynes, 13 F. App’x at 169; Brief of Appellees, supra note 6, at 14; Tarkan,
supra note 5.
19. Upon learning that they were entitled to a special education due process
hearing, Brian and Juliana Jaynes filed a request for this hearing, alleging that Newport
News School District committed several substantive and procedural violations of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The Jayneses also sought to
challenge the school’s IEP for Stefan and obtain reimbursement from the school district
for the intensive educational services Stefan received at home. The local hearing officer
(LHO) found that Newport repeatedly failed to follow the procedures set forth in the
IDEA and ordered Newport to indemnify the Jayneses of $117,979.78 for the educational
expenses they incurred. Newport then appealed the decision to the state review officer
(SRO). The SRO upheld the decision of the LHO, but reduced the award to $56,090.84
based on his determination that the statute of limitations prevented the parents from
recovering reimbursement for expended costs prior to the date the parents requested a
due process hearing. Brief of Appellees, supra note 6, at 18. Thereafter, the Jayneses
appealed the decision to the U.S. District Court, seeking reinstatement of the original
award amount. The court determined that Newport violated the IDEA by failing to
inform Stefan’s parents of their right to a due process hearing and concluded that they
were entitled to recovery of $102,929.45 of the amount accrued. Newport then appealed
the district court’s judgment to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of
appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court. Jaynes, 13 F. App’x at 170.
20. Tarkan, supra note 5.
21. Id.
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Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 22 are receiving an appropriately tailored
education has become a hot legal topic in schools and in the
The increased legal activity has resulted from
courtroom. 23
disagreements between parents 24 of children with ASD and the school
district regarding the methodology employed on the given student, the
adequacy of the school’s support services, decisions regarding whether
the student’s placement is in the least restrictive environment (LRE), and
the length of services provided by the school district. 25
The noticeable increase in litigation by parents of children with ASD
may largely be attributable to the disorder’s legal recognition as one of
the developmental disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA). In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 26 which was renamed the IDEA
in 1991. 27 The IDEA was then reauthorized in 1997 28 and again in

22. The terms autism, Autism Disorder, and Autism Spectrum Disorder are often
used interchangeably throughout the medical community. Therefore, references made to
any of these terms in this Comment should be understood to encompass individuals
diagnosed with any manifestation of an Autism Spectrum Disorder.
23. Perry A. Zirkel, The Autism Case Law: Administrative and Judicial Rulings,
17 FOCUS ON AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 84, 84 (2002).
24. The term parent shall mean a natural, adoptive, or foster parent of a child
(unless state law prohibits the foster parent from serving as a parent), a guardian (but not
the state if the child is a ward of the state), a person acting in the place of a natural or
adoptive parent (including a grandparent, stepparent, or other relative) with whom the
child lives, a person legally responsible for the child’s welfare, or a person assigned to be
a surrogate parent under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23) (Supp. V 2005).
25. L. Juane Heflin & Richard Simpson, Interventions for Children and Youth with
Autism: Prudent Choices in a World of Exaggerated Claims and Empty Promises. Part
II: Legal/Policy Analysis and Recommendations for Selecting Interventions and Treatments,
13 FOCUS ON AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 212, 212–14 (1998).
26. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142,
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat.) 773 (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1487 (Supp. IV
2004)). Before the passage of the Act, two prominent cases formed the foundation for
what would become the EAHCA. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874
(D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the Board of Education has an affirmative duty to provide
specialized instruction adapted to the child’s needs that will enable him to benefit in the
educational setting); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,
302 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (finding that the exclusion of mentally retarded students from
Pennsylvania public schools offended due process and the right to a free appropriate
public education, and, therefore, entering a consent judgment providing extensive rights
to children with disabilities to address these inadequacies).
27. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-119, 105 Stat. 587.
28. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000)).
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2004. 29 Through its enactment, the federal government placed on school
districts and educators the affirmative duty to “ensure that all children
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education
that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs.” 30 To ensure that the school district adheres to the
IDEA’s overarching purposes, the Act provides certain procedural
safeguards to the parents of eligible students with disabilities.31 Some of
these safeguards include a parent’s right to an impartial due process
hearing, the right to bring a civil action against the school district or
educator if the parent is dissatisfied with the decision rendered in the
administrative hearing, and the right to be accompanied and advised by
legal counsel and by experts having special knowledge or training
regarding children with disabilities. 32 Moreover, the IDEA provides that
a court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party who is
the parent of the child with a disability as part of the costs associated
with the litigation process. 33 By including these provisions, Congress

29. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647.
30. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp.
IV 2004).
31. The IDEA serves four stated purposes:
(1) (A) to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a
free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education
and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare
them for further education, employment, and independent living;
(B) to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of
such children are protected; and
(C) to assist States, localities, educational service agencies, and Federal
agencies to provide for the education of all children with disabilities;
(2) to assist States in the implementation of a statewide, comprehensive,
coordinated, multidisciplinary, interagency system of early intervention
services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families;
(3) to ensure that educators and parents have the necessary tools to improve
educational results for children with disabilities by supporting system
improvement activities; coordinated research and personnel preparation;
coordinated technical assistance, dissemination, and support; and technology
development and media services; and
(4) to assess, and ensure the effectiveness of, efforts to educate children with
disabilities.
Id. § 1400(d)(1)–(4).
32. Id. § 1415(b)(6), (i)(2)(A), (h)(1).
33. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). This Comment discusses the ability of prevailing
parents to recover expert fees under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). However, the IDEA does not
foreclose the possibility—albeit rare—of a school district recovering costs against the
attorney of the parent, or the parent, if the complaint or subsequent cause of action was
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” or was presented for an “improper
purpose.” At its discretion, a court may also award costs to the school district if the
attorney of the parent continued to litigate the case after it “clearly became frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)–(III).
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sought to ensure that the school district would not have a unique advantage
over the parents in information and expertise. 34
IDEA-related cases involving students with ASD have caused an everincreasing challenge for school districts, parents, education lawyers, and
advocates to afford the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE).35
Although a substantial amount of research on educational interventions
for children with ASD exists, 36 researchers have yet to identify a
specific behavioral approach that will yield positive results for all
children with the disorder, which is largely due to the fact that ASD
manifests differently in each affected child. 37 Thus, while research has
indicated that certain interventions produce positive outcomes,
determining which methodology the school district ought to employ,
based on the child’s unique set of characteristics, is a difficult task. 38
Accessibility to expert evaluation for parents of children with ASD,
therefore, is crucial to bringing successful claims against a school
district for its lack of adherence to the IDEA’s requirements in providing
the child an appropriate, individually tailored education.39 However, while
parents may still utilize the expertise and recommendations of such
individuals, the recent Supreme Court decision of Arlington Central
School District Board of Education v. Murphy now prevents the recovery of
nonattorney expert fees to prevailing parents in an IDEA-related suit as
part of the “costs” recoverable under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(B)(3) of the
IDEA. 40 As a result of this decision, parents will now have to bear the
financial costs of experts if they seek to mount a successful action
against a well-equipped school district—a burden that low-income
parents will not be able to shoulder. 41

34. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 60–61 (2005).
35. Mitchell L. Yell et al., Developing Legally Correct and Educationally
Appropriate Programs for Students with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 18 FOCUS ON
AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 182, 182 (2003). For further explanation of
what constitutes a “free appropriate public education,” see discussion infra Part III.C.
36. Rose Iovannone et al., Effective Educational Practices for Students with Autism
Spectrum Disorders, 18 FOCUS ON AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 150,
151 (2003).
37. Id. at 150–51.
38. Heflin & Simpson, supra note 25, at 216.
39. Myrna R. Mandlawitz, The Impact of the Legal System on Educational
Programming for Young Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder, 32 J. AUTISM &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 495, 497 (2002).
40. 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2006).
41. Julie Rawe, Who Pays for Special Ed?, TIME, Sept. 25, 2006, at 62, 63.
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This Comment addresses how the Arlington decision, in disallowing
the recovery of expert witness fees, will adversely impact parents of
children with ASD who seek to invoke due process against the school
district. 42 Part III examines the controversy between parents and school
districts in providing the most appropriate behavioral interventions and
therapies to the child with ASD and the reasons behind the increase in
IDEA-related litigation, particularly with respect to students diagnosed
with ASD. Part III also explores the meaning of a FAPE, the procedural
safeguards afforded to parents of children eligible under the Act, and the
congressional intent behind the IDEA’s “costs” provision with respect to
whether Congress intended expert witness fees to be recoverable as
costs. Part IV includes a discussion of the majority and dissenting
opinions in Arlington and an analysis of the Supreme Court’s use of
specific statutory approaches to interpret the “costs” provision. Part IV
also details why the Supreme Court made an incorrect ruling based on
the legislative history of the Act and prior case law and describes how
this decision, coupled with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Schaffer v.
Weast, which placed the burden of proof on the party seeking relief in an
IDEA suit, will discourage parents from challenging the school
district. 43 Part V explains how these decisions will impact children with
ASD and emphasizes what must now take place from the parent’s
perspective, post-Arlington, to secure an appropriately tailored education
for students with ASD. This Comment concludes that to uphold the
IDEA’s purpose of providing the student a free appropriate public
education, Congress must revise the IDEA’s “costs” provision to clearly
express its intent to include expert witness fees as a recoverable cost by
the prevailing party.
III. AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER AND ITS UNIQUENESS
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE IDEA
A. Background of Autism Spectrum Disorder
As one of the listed disorders under the umbrella of Autism Spectrum
Disorders, autism is a complex developmental disability impairing
communication and social interaction. 44 Typically diagnosed before the
42. Due process is a term of art in special education. Before a parent of a child
with a disability or the school district can file a civil action in federal or state court, the
parties must first exhaust all administrative remedies provided under the IDEA. See 20
U.S.C. § 1415(a)–(i), (l) (Supp. IV 2004).
43. 546 U.S 49, 62 (2005).
44. Autism Society of America, What Is Autism?, http://www.autism-society.
org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_whatis_home (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). Autism
is one of the five disorders falling under Pervasive Developmental Disorders (PDD)—a
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age of three, autism is the result of a lifelong neurological disorder that
affects the proper functioning of the brain. 45 Individuals with autism
exhibit a unique combination of pervasive behavioral deficiencies and
excesses, which negatively affect the most important aspects of life,
including the ability to meaningfully engage in social interactions as
well as communicate one’s thoughts or feelings with others. 46 The
disability is also associated with the presence of repetitive or stereotypic
behavior, restricted interests, lack of pretend play in younger children,
lack of joint attention, and abnormal sensory behaviors. 47 Because ASD
encompasses a myriad of specific behavioral symptoms that can range
from mild to severe, children with the same diagnosis may manifest
these characteristics differently. 48 For instance, one child may flap his
or her arms to show excitement in a given situation, another may
respond to the same stimulus by smiling softly, and a third child may sit
in the corner rocking back and forth apparently emotionless. 49
Once noted as a rare disorder, autism is undeniably more widely
diagnosed today than it was in the past ten or fifteen years. 50 ASD
occurs in all ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic groups, and boys are four

category of neurological disorders exhibiting varying degrees of impairment in many
areas of an individual’s social, cognitive, and linguistic development. The five disorders
provided under the umbrella of PDD include Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder,
Childhood Disintegrative Disorder (CDD), Rett’s Disorder, and PDD-Not Otherwise
Specified (PDD-NOS). Id.
45. LAURA SCHREIBMAN, THE SCIENCE AND FICTION OF AUTISM 2 (2005); Autism
Society of America, supra note 44.
46. Autism Society of America, Characteristics of Autism, http://www.autismsociety.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_whatis_characteristics (last visited Feb.
26, 2008).
47. See generally ROBERT L. KOEGEL & LYNN KERN KOEGEL, PIVOTAL RESPONSE
TREATMENTS FOR AUTISM 41 (2006) (discussing symptoms attributable to children with
Autism Spectrum Disorder).
48. Autism Society of America, supra note 46. Autism Spectrum Disorders range
from a mild form, such as Asperger Syndrome, to a severe form, such as Autistic
Disorder. If a child possesses symptoms of either of these disorders but does not
sufficiently meet the disorder’s diagnostic criteria, medical professionals will typically
diagnose him or her as having a Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise
Specified (PDD-NOS). Rett Syndrome and Child Disintegrative Disorder are also
included as spectrum disorders, but they are extremely rare. See also National Institute
of Mental Health, Autism Spectrum Disorders (Pervasive Development Disorders),
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/autism/complete-publication.shtml (last visited
Feb. 26, 2008).
49. Wrightslaw, Autism, ASD, PDD, Asperger Syndrome, http://www.wrightslaw.
com/info/autism.index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
50. BRYNA SIEGEL, HELPING CHILDREN WITH AUTISM LEARN 14 (2003).
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to five times more likely to have ASD than girls. 51 In 2004, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) indicated that the prevalence
rate for autism was one in 166 children. 52 However, data released in
early 2007 found that one in 150 eight-year-olds in multiple regions of
the United States have ASD, which translates into roughly 1.5 million
Americans affected with ASD. 53 According to the United States
Department of Education, autism is growing at a rate of ten to seventeen
percent every year, and the number of individuals affected will reach
nearly four million in the United States alone within the next decade. 54
While it appears that ASD may be on the rise, part of this exponential
increase may be attributable to greater awareness within the community
and better diagnosis by medical professionals. Due to differences in
criteria used to diagnose individuals, strategies to obtain relevant data,
and population demographic characteristics, there remains variability in
reported prevalence rates. 55 One reason for the increase is that the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR)
published by the American Psychiatric Association, which is the official
standard used to diagnose children with ASD, has been continually
revised to include more diagnostic criteria. 56 It also now includes a
reclassification of children previously identified under another disability
Thus, children previously diagnosed with mental
category. 57
retardation, for instance, now fall within the spectrum under the new
criteria if they also display autistic characteristics. 58
Another explanation for the dramatic increase in children diagnosed
with ASD is Congress’s inclusion of autism as a recognized disability
category under the IDEA in 1990. 59 During the 1991–1992 school year,
the nationwide educational system served a total of 5415 students with
51. Id. at 22, 25; Autism Society of America, supra note 44.
52. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Autism Information Center,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/faq_prevalence.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
53. Id.; Autism Society of America, supra note 44. Note, however, that the current
prevalence rate of autism, which was based on a study conducted by CDC’s Autism
Developmental Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) Network, is not a representative sample
of the entire United States population and should not be generalized to every community
within the United States. This data is only accurate with respect to the specific regions
involved in the study. Therefore, prevalence rates may differ in populations outside of
the study. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 52.
54. Autism Society of America, supra note 44.
55. Iovannone et al., supra note 36, at 151.
56. SIEGEL, supra note 50, at 14. See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR (4th ed.
text rev. 2000).
57. SIEGEL, supra note 50, at 14–15.
58. Id. At the time of the first major shift to DSM-III-R (the revised third edition),
roughly a third more children became diagnosable with ASD. Id. at 14.
59. Zirkel, supra note 23, at 84.
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ASD under the IDEA. 60 The number of eligible students with ASD
significantly increased by the 1999–2000 school year in which 65,424
students with ASD received special education services—a 1108%
increase. 61 To put this in perspective, all other eligible students with
disabilities served under the IDEA represented only a 26.3% increase
during the same time period. 62 Today, the IDEA provides special
education services to more than 200,000 children with ASD in the
United States. 63
B. Early Intervention Strategies
Presently, research has failed to identify any effective means to
prevent the disorder, develop a specific treatment yielding positive
results for all of those affected, or discover a cure. 64 Consequently, all
aspects of the disorder—ranging from etiology to diagnosis and the
procurement of effective intervention strategies—feature differing
viewpoints on the type of appropriate services for young children with
ASD. This lack of consensus has stirred up controversy among the
scientific, medical, and educational communities, as well as families
with children with ASD. 65 Scientists seek to assess the efficacy of a
given therapy by its methodology and replicability, while parents search
for case studies or videotaped presentations of children who have
obtained positive, concrete outcomes in communicative and social
functioning using a specific program.66 Seeing such testimonials provides
parents of young children with ASD the solace they need to select a
treatment option that will be most advantageous for their respective

60. F. Edward Yasbak, Autism in the United States: A Perspective, 8 J. AM.
PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 103, 103 (2003); Yell et al., supra note 35, at 182.
61. Yell et al., supra note 35, at 182.
62. Id.
63. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 52. Based on 2005
statistics, 193,637 children ages six to twenty-one and 30,305 children ages three to five
received special education and related services through the public school system under
the disability category of “autism.” Id.
64. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON AUTISM
2004: CHILDREN’S HEALTH ACT OF 2000, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/
research-funding/scientific-meetings/recurring-meetings/iacc/reports/autismreport2004.pdf.
65. Edward Feinberg & John Vacca, The Drama and Trauma of Creating Policies
on Autism: Critical Issues to Consider in the New Millennium, 15 FOCUS ON AUTISM &
OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 130, 130 (2000).
66. Id. at 131.
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child. 67
However, irrespective of this lack of consensus on the “most
successful methodology,” extensive research has indicated that early
diagnosis and intervention produce dramatically better outcomes for
individuals with ASD. The earlier the child receives a diagnosis, the
greater the opportunity for the child to gain the maximum benefit from
one of the existing therapies. 68 While there are many therapies available
for children with ASD, Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA), 69 Discrete
Trial Training (DTT), 70 and the Treatment and Education of Autistic and
67. Id.
68. Autism Society of America, Diagnosis and Consultation, http://www.autismsociety.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_whatis_diagnosis (last visited Feb. 26,
2008).
69. Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) is an intervention approach developed in
1987 by Dr. O. Ivar Lovaas that is based on shaping the child’s behavior through
reinforcement mechanisms. ABA focuses on the breakdown of skills into smaller
distinct tasks taught by trained instructors in a highly structured manner. The instructors
conduct individual analyses of the child’s functioning abilities to identify skills
necessary for improved performance and develop a curriculum based on the child’s
strengths and weaknesses. The intervention is then structured to produce appropriate
behaviors through positive reinforcement and prompting. For instance, if the child
expresses interest in a toy, the instructor will prompt the child to ask for the toy using an
appropriate form of communication. As the intervention progresses, the instructor
expands the reinforcement and gradually introduces structured time to allow for the
integration of more difficult skills into the child’s developmental scheme. The instructor
will also work with the child to reduce inappropriate behavior by teaching alternate
methods to communicate his or her needs in a more socially acceptable fashion. See
Daniel H. Ingram, Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions with Autism Spectrum Disorder,
in COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS 255, 258 (Rosemary
B. Mennuti et al. eds., 2006); L. Juane Heflin & Richard L. Simpson, Interventions for
Children and Youth with Autism: Prudent Choices in a World of Exaggerated Claims
and Empty Promises. Part I: Intervention and Treatment Option Review, 13 FOCUS ON
AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 194, 200 (1998); Autism Society of
America, Learning Approaches, http://www.autism-society.org/site/ PageServer?pagename=about_
treatment_learning (last visited Feb. 26, 2008); The Lovaas Institute, The Lovaas
Approach, http://www.lovaas.com/approach-method.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
70. Discrete Trial Training (DTT) is a method used for the implementation of
ABA for students with ASD. DTT sets forth a basic one-on-one approach whereby the
instructor cues the student to perform, provides positive reinforcement for the desired
behavior, and continually evaluates the student’s performance. For example, the
instructor may ask the child to match two shapes of the same color. If the child does not
produce the desired goal, the instructor will facilitate the achievement of that goal by
physically providing assistance. The instructor continues this process until the student
can independently perform the task on his or her own. The ABA/DTT approach has
proven to produce positive gains in the child’s IQ, language comprehension and
expression, and social interaction skills. However, while ABA is one of the most
effective treatment methods available, it is also one of the most controversial. Questions
remain as to whether the ABA method ought to be used exclusively on the affected child
(to the exclusion of other educational methods), whether the heavy focus on the child’s
behavioral tendencies may ignore the underlying neurological characteristics of autism,
and whether the extensive use of ABA and DTT therapy (up to forty hours per week for
the given child) is suitable for the child’s needs. See Heflin & Simpson, supra note 69,
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Related Communication-Handicapped Children (TEACCH) program 71
are some of the most extensively utilized treatments in both home-based
and school-based settings. 72
C. IDEA’s Promises to Children with ASD: FAPE, IEP, and LRE
As its first stated purpose, the IDEA proclaims that all children are
entitled to a “free appropriate public education that emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs . . . .”73
Essentially, a FAPE is a publicly funded and individually tailored
educational program aimed to meet the needs of a child with a
disability. 74 The IDEA specifies that such an education and related
services 75 be provided to a child with a disability at public expense,
at 201; Autism Society of America, supra note 69.
71. The Treatment and Education of Autistic and Related CommunicationHandicapped Children (TEACCH) program focuses on the child’s needs, skills, and
interests rather than on the child’s behavior. The approach seeks to assist the child in
adaptive functioning by modifying the surrounding environment to accommodate for his
or her specific characteristics. Essentially, TEACCH develops an individualized
curriculum that emphasizes visual, rather than verbal, learning and uses structure and
predictability to encourage the child to engage in spontaneous communication. Many
studies have validated the TEACCH model by illustrating its effectiveness in identifying
the child’s emerging skills and adapting those skills to a modified environment.
However, concerns regarding the program revolve around whether TEACCH places
sufficient emphasis on the child’s social and communicative development and whether it
employs an exclusionary approach, which isolates the child with ASD from other
typically developing children. Despite its potential drawbacks, however, the TEACCH
method is largely used in a classroom setting and is a valuable method of instruction for
teaching important skills. See Heflin & Simpson, supra note 69, at 201; Autism Society
of America, Learning Approaches, supra note 69; Division TEACCH, What is
TEACCH?, http://www.teacch.com/whatis.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
72. Division TEACCH, What is TEACCH?, supra note 71; The Lovaas Institute,
Consultation Based Services, http://www.lovaas.com/services_consultation.php (last visited
Feb. 26, 2008).
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2004).
74. Mitchell L. Yell & Eric Drasgow, Litigating a Free Appropriate Public
Education: The Lovaas Hearings and Cases, 33 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 205, 205 (1999).
75. “Related services” entail student transportation as well as any developmental,
corrective, or other supportive services necessary to identify disabling conditions in
children and to allow a child to benefit from special education. Examples of such
services include speech-language pathology, interpreting services, psychological
services, physical and occupational therapy, social work services, school nurse services,
recreation, counseling services, and certain medical services. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)
(Supp. IV 2004). The 2006 IDEA Regulations regarding the Special Education and
Related Services provision state that “related services” include appropriate monitoring
and maintenance of medical devices necessary for the maintenance of the child’s health
and safety, including breathing, nutrition, or the operation of other bodily functions.
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under public supervision, and without charge. 76 To ensure a state
affords each child a FAPE, the IDEA conditions the state’s receipt of
funding on its adherence to certain guidelines. 77 Thus, the state receives
assistance, based on the state eligibility provisions of the IDEA, if it agrees
to identify children with disabilities, properly evaluate them, and
implement an educational program suited to their respective needs. 78
The “heart of IDEA,” and a vital component of a child’s FAPE, is the
Individualized Education Program (IEP).79 The IEP is a written document
produced through a collaborative process between the school district and
the child’s parents that is designed to afford the student an appropriate
educational program. 80 While the IDEA does not enumerate specific
services to be administered to eligible students based on their respective
disabilities, the statute does require the school district to take certain
affirmative steps when identifying students who may have a disability
and are, therefore, in need of special education. 81 First, the school
district must carry out a thorough assessment of the child’s individual
needs to determine his or her eligibility under the IDEA. 82 This includes
verification that the student fits within one of the enumerated disabilities
defined in the Act and the determination that he or she requires special
education and related services due to that disability. 83 The school must
then use the data obtained during the child’s assessment as a basis for
the implementation of the special education services and as a
measurement of the student’s progress. 84
Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 34 C.F.R
§ 300.34(b)(2)(ii) (2007). However, such “related services” do not include a surgicallyimplanted medical device, the optimization of the device’s functioning, or maintenance
or replacement of the device. Services do cover the routine checking of an external
component of the surgically-implanted device. Id. § 300.34(b).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A); see also id. § 1401(3) (defining what constitutes a
child with a disability).
77. Id. § 1412(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
78. See generally id. § 1412 (listing eligibility requirements with which a state
must comply during each fiscal year to receive federal grants under the IDEA).
79. Yell et al., supra note 35, at 184.
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2004); Autism
Society of America, Individualized Education Plan (IEP), http://www.autismsociety.org/site/ PageServer?pagename=about_education_IEP (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
Following the reauthorization of the IDEA in 1997, parents must now be included in the
IEP process when making decisions on the educational placement of the child. As equal
participants in the IEP process, parents have the right to suggest goals for the child and
provide any information that may be helpful in tailoring the IEP around the child’s needs.
Upon completion of the written document, the IDEA requires unanimous approval of the
student’s IEP from all involved parties in the IEP meeting. Autism Society of America, supra.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4); Yell et al., supra note 35, at 184.
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1).
83. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i); Yell et al., supra note 35, at 184.
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4)(A), (c)(1).
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The second critical step the school district must take after confirming
the student’s eligibility under the IDEA is to create an IEP team. 85 The
IEP team consists of the parents of the child, local educational agency
(LEA) officials, at least one regular education teacher of the child (if the
child spends or may spend any time in regular education), the child’s
special education teacher, and other supportive personnel. 86 Together,
the team develops an IEP that describes the student’s present level of
educational performance and states his or her measurable goals—based
on the child’s unique needs resulting from the disability—for one year. 87
The LEA must review the current IEP on an annual basis and must
supply periodic reports on the progress the child is making with respect
to meeting his or her annual goals. 88 If the child does not achieve the
goals set forth in the IEP, the LEA must then review the IEP and, where
appropriate, make revisions to address the child’s lack of expected
progress toward those goals. 89

85. Id. § 1414(b)(4); Yell et al., supra note 35, at 184.
86. Specifically, in the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA, the Act requires the IEP
team to be composed of the parents of the child, at least one regular education teacher (if
the child is or may be participating in a regular classroom environment), at least one
special education teacher of the student, a representative of the school district (or LEA
official) who is qualified to oversee and supervise the child’s educational plan and is
knowledgeable about the educational curriculum and the school district’s availability of
resources, an individual who can interpret the data collected during the student’s
assessment and provide instructional options, any individuals with knowledge or special
expertise regarding the child and his or her disability (at the discretion of the parent or
agency), and the child (when necessary or appropriate). 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B);
Candace Cortiella, IDEA 2004 Close Up: The Individualized Education Program (IEP)
(March 24, 2005), http://www.schwablearning.org/articles.aspx?r=978.
87. The statement of the child’s present level of performance included in the IEP
was revised in IDEA 2004 to illustrate the child’s educational achievements and
functional performance and, thus, emphasize the importance of all parts of his or her
development, rather than just academic performance. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A). Also
note, with respect to the child’s IEP, the duration of the IEP is not based on the academic
school year; rather it expires twelve months from the date on the initial IEP. See id.
§1414(d)(4)(A).
88. The periodic reports must be supplied as often as the general education
teachers supply report cards. It is extremely important that the school district adhere to
this requirement because parents need to be informed as to whether their child is
benefiting from the educational program and whether his or her desired outcomes are
achievable within the duration of the IEP. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(III).
89. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A); see Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982)
(identifying the IEP as an integral part of providing an eligible student with a FAPE).
Both the school district and the parents may modify or amend the IEP after the annual
IEP meeting without having to reconvene the entire team. While the IEP does not need
to be completely rewritten, parents may nevertheless request a revised IEP reflecting the
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Finally, the IEP team must place the child in an appropriate educational
setting. When making a placement decision, the team must look to
many factors including the child’s adaptive behavior, social and cultural
background, physical condition, and performance on aptitude and achievement
tests. 90 The team must also place the child in an environment that is
conducive to meeting his or her IEP goals. To achieve such goals, the
IDEA requires that the school district educate the child in the least
restrictive environment (LRE) as part of its guarantee of a FAPE. 91 The
LRE mandate requires mainstreaming, or educating the disabled student
in a general education classroom with other nondisabled students to the
“maximum extent appropriate.”92 When the child’s learning in the general
education setting does not produce satisfactory results, the IDEA permits
his or her removal to other special classes or to separate schooling. 93
Thus, although the IDEA favors integration, it acknowledges that the child’s
needs may necessitate placement in a more restrictive environment when
the general education classroom is not appropriate, even with the support
of supplementary aids and other services. 94
With respect to children with ASD, a core concern among school
districts and parents is determining the restrictiveness of the educational
setting. Since the IDEA does not establish a framework for selecting the
least restrictive environment for the student, 95 the IEP team is left to
changes or modifications made. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(F). In addition, if any changes
are made to the child’s IEP resulting from an agreement with a member of the IEP and
the parent outside the IEP Team meeting process, such changes or modifications must be
disclosed to the IEP Team. 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4)(ii) (2007).
90. Yell et al., supra note 35, at 184.
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). The general education classroom would typically be
the least restrictive educational setting for the child and a completely segregated school,
institution, or hospital the most restrictive. Id.
92. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. However case law has established a “presumptive inclusion,” which is a
presumption in favor of mainstreaming, that provides a standard the courts have used to
determine the least restrictive environment for the student:
Adhering to the language of the EHA, we discern a two part test for
determining compliance with the mainstreaming requirement. First, we ask
whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids
and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child. If it cannot and
the school intends to provide special education or to remove the child from
regular education, we ask, second, whether the school has mainstreamed the
child to the maximum extent appropriate. . . . [O]ur analysis is an individualized,
fact-specific inquiry that requires us to examine carefully the nature and
severity of the child’s handicapping condition, his needs and abilities, and the
schools’ response to the child’s needs.
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted); see also Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983) (“In a case
where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether
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decide, based on the child’s individualized goals and objectives, which
“placement or combination of placement options” will produce positive
outcomes before the expiration of his or her annual IEP. 96 Due to
varying interpretations of the LRE provision, placement challenges
continue to surface, with some members of the IEP process favoring
restrictive home-based or institutional instruction for the given child, and
others believing the child can only benefit by full inclusion in the
general education classroom. 97 Still others stress that while segregation
may be necessary for the child in an academic sense, the school must
still mainstream the child in the general education setting for
nonacademic activities, so that he or she can interact with nondisabled
students “to the maximum extent possible.” 98
D. Procedural Safeguards to Secure a Substantive Right
While all students in special education are entitled to a FAPE, Congress
has never provided a substantive definition of the term either in the
IDEA or in any subsequent federal legislation. 99 Some critics believe
Congress’s omission was both intentional and strategic; recognizing that
every FAPE would vary according to the child’s distinctive needs and
goals, Congress sought to ensure that parents would be meaningfully
involved in the creation and execution of their child’s IEP. 100 However,
despite this omission, Congress did set forth specific procedural
safeguards for parents to protect their child’s guarantee of a FAPE.
Consequently, parents have invoked these procedural due process rights
when in disagreement with the school district regarding what constitutes
a FAPE for their particular child. 101
Arising from such a disagreement over whether a child’s IEP provided
the services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a nonsegregated setting. If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be
inappropriate under the Act.”).
96. Heflin & Simpson, supra note 25, at 214.
97. Id.
98. Sarah E. Farley, Comment, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom
Placement of Students with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REV. 809, 834
(2002).
99. Yell & Drasgow, supra note 74, at 206.
100. Id.
101. For a thorough account of recent cases brought under specific provisions of the
IDEA, see Karen Norlander, The Emerging Caselaw Involving Students with Disabilities, in
SCHOOL LAW SERIES (SIXTH ANNUAL) 81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. 160, 2006).
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an adequate FAPE was the first special education case heard by the
United States Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Board of
Education v. Rowley. 102 In Rowley, the Court established the meaning of
a FAPE under the IDEA and developed a standard for assessing whether
the school district fulfilled the mandate for this substantive right. 103 The
Court explained that while public education is available to all students
with disabilities under the Act, a FAPE requires more than mere access
to special education services. However, the Court also noted that “Congress
did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational
standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful.” 104
In other words, the Court interpreted an “appropriate” education to
include not a “guarantee [of] any particular level of education,” but rather
one that is individually designed to grant some educational benefit to the
child.105 Thus, the Court ruled that students with disabilities do not have an
enforceable right to an education permitting them to achieve their
maximum potential. Rather, the IDEA entitles them to an education that
is “reasonably calculated” to produce an educational benefit. 106
Significant to the decision, the Rowley Court emphasized that because
courts lack the expertise necessary for evaluating the soundness of
educational approaches, decisions regarding a school district’s choice of
methodology are “for resolution by the States.” 107 Therefore, as long as
the educational practices adhere to the requirements set forth in the
IDEA, the courts will not challenge the school’s judgment. A hearing
officer may, however, assess whether the methodology employed at the
time of the hearing or trial is producing an educational benefit for the
child and hold that support must continue. 108 Moreover, the hearing
officer may even support one-on-one instruction, an in-home setting
versus a school setting, or a certain level of intensity for the child, but he
or she cannot indicate that the ABA approach, for example, is better than
102. 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982).
103. The standard for assessing whether the school district has complied with the
provisions of the IDEA in providing a FAPE to a student with a disability involves a
two-part test. To determine whether a child’s IEP provides “some educational benefit,”
the Court asked:
First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And
second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act’s
procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits? If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the
obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.
Id. at 200, 206–07.
104. Id. at 192.
105. Id. at 192, 201.
106. Id. at 204.
107. Id. at 208.
108. Mandlawitz, supra note 39, at 496.
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the TEACCH program or other methodologies. 109 Rather, this discretion
is left entirely to the school district.
The school’s decisionmaking authority regarding the choice and
application of a preferred methodology, however, does not remain
unchecked. The Rowley Court specifically addressed and disposed of
this concern, stating that “parents and guardians will not lack ardor” in
actively seeking the benefits entitled to their children under the Act
because the IDEA affords parents numerous procedural safeguards to
secure those rights. 110 Furthermore, the Court read the IDEA as a
mechanism for maximizing parental support, concluding that
[i]t seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much
emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large
measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process, . . . as it
did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive
standard. 111

Section 1415 of the IDEA enumerates these types of procedures that the
state educational agency (SEA), state agency, or local educational
agency (LEA) must establish and maintain to continue to obtain federal
assistance. 112 As previously mentioned, the IDEA guarantees parents of
a child with a disability the opportunity to participate in the entire IEP
process, including identification, evaluation, educational placement, or
any issue involving the provisions of a FAPE. 113 Moreover, if the
parents are dissatisfied with the school’s evaluation, they may request an
independent educational evaluation (IEE) of their child at public expense
by a qualified examiner. 114 If the district grants the request, it must not
unreasonably delay an IEE and it must consider the results of the IEE
when assessing the child’s eligibility for services or when developing the
child’s IEP if the IEE meets the agency criteria. 115
109. Id.
110. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209.
111. Id. at 205–06.
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
113. Id. § 1415(b)(1).
114. Id.
115. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (2007). If the school district denies the request for an
IEE, it shall invoke a due process hearing to demonstrate that its evaluation of the child
was in fact appropriate for his or her educational needs. Even if the presiding judge or
hearing officer finds the evaluation to be sufficient, however, parents may still obtain an
IEE at their own expense. 34 C.F.R § 300.502(c)(1); Technical Assistance ALLIANCE
for Parent Centers, Evaluation: What Does It Mean For Your Child? (2007),
http://www.taalliance.org/publications/ALL11.pdf. Also, the IDEA entitles the parent to
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The IDEA requires that the school district provide prior written notice
to the child’s parents if the school either seeks to initiate or change, or
refuses to initiate or change, the child’s IEP. 116 Not only must the
school district include an explanation of why it proposes or refuses to
take the specified action—including a description of the evaluation,
record, assessment, procedure, or report it uses to base its decision—but
it must also provide a statement notifying the parents of the
procedural safeguards they may utilize under § 1415. 117 In addition, §
1415(b)(6) provides parents the opportunity to present complaints
against the school district alleging a violation that occurred relating
to the child’s identification, evaluation, placement, or the provisions of
a FAPE. 118 Following the filing of the complaint by the parents, the
district is required to convene a resolution session within fifteen days to
attempt to resolve the dispute. 119 If the parents and the district are
unable to reach an agreement, both parties may also seek resolution
through formal mediation. If the parents opt for the mediation process,
the state must supply a list of qualified mediators knowledgeable about
the law and regulations relating to special education and related
services. 120 The state must also cover the costs associated with the
mediation. 121 If, on the other hand, the parents request a due process
hearing, either the state or local educational agency—as determined by
the state or the state educational agency—must initiate the
proceeding. 122 For these hearings, parents have “the right to be
accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with special
knowledge or training with respect to the problems of children with
disabilities.” 123 Hence, the IDEA entitles parents to the legal support of
attorneys and experts in the field of special education law.
If any party is dissatisfied with the result of the due process hearing,
they may appeal the decision to the state educational agency, if the state
has a two-tier system, or they can bring a civil action in any state court
of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States
without regard to the amount in controversy. 124 With respect to the civil
action, the court will analyze the findings from the administrative
only one IEE at public expense for every time the LEA conducts an evaluation of the
child with which the parent disagrees. 34 C.F.R § 300.502(b)(1).
116. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).
117. Id. § 1415(c)(1)(B)–(C).
118. Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A)–(B).
119. Id. § 1415(e), (f)(1)(B).
120. Id. § 1415(e)(2)(C).
121. Id. § 1415(e)(2)(D).
122. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
123. Id. § 1415(h)(1).
124. Id. § 1415(g)(1), (i)(2)(A).
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hearing and will hear any additional evidence at a party’s request. 125
After making its ruling based on a preponderance of the evidence
standard, the court “may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the
costs” to the party prevailing in the suit who is the parent of the child
with a disability. 126
While § 1415(i)(3)(B) states that a party may recover attorneys’ fees
resulting from a favorable decision in an IDEA-related suit, it is unclear,
based on the plain language of the text, what the phrase “as part of the
costs” exactly entails. The IDEA specifically affords parents the opportunity
to be accompanied by counsel and expert witnesses knowledgeable
about the child’s disability during a due process hearing or during the
appeals process. However, because Congress did not provide a
substantive definition of the “costs” recoverable by the prevailing party,
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) does not indicate whether expert fees fit within this
framework. Despite the ambiguous nature of the IDEA’s costs provision,
there is some indication in the legislative history of the IDEA that
Congress intended for the term “costs” to encompass expert witness fees
as well. Of particular note is the Conference Committee Report No. 99687, approved by Congress while drafting the statute, which announces:
The conferees intend that the term “attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” include
reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of
any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the
parent or guardian’s case in the action or proceeding, as well as traditional costs
incurred in the course of litigating a case. 127

Irrespective of what appears to be Congress’s desire to include expert
fees as part of the costs, this language was never integrated into
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). For this reason, a circuit split developed; some courts
concluded that the provision ought to be read in a textualist manner,
demonstrating that the plain language did not include reimbursement for
expert witness fees. 128 Other rulings, however, favored a more liberal

125. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i)–(ii).
126. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), (i)(3)(B).
127. H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1807, 1808.
128. See, e.g., Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Mo. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Springfield R-12 Sch. Dist., 358 F.3d
992, 1002 (8th Cir. 2004); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 481–82
(7th Cir. 2003); Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1031 (8th Cir. 2003);
Arons v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58, 62 (3d Cir. 1988); Eirschele v. Craven
County Bd. of Educ., 7 F. Supp. 2d 655, 659–60 (E.D.N.C. 1998); Cynthia K. v. Bd. of
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approach to statutory interpretation, supporting the notion that the
language set forth in the Conference Committee Report ought to be read
in conjunction with § 1415(i)(3)(B) so as to afford prevailing parents the
ability to recover such fees. 129 The United States Supreme Court has
now laid to rest the debate in the legal community over whether
prevailing parents could recover expert fees in its recent decision of
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy.
IV. SETTING THE PRECEDENT: ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD OF EDUCATION V. MURPHY
In June 2006, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the IDEA entitles prevailing parents to the recovery of
nonattorney expert fees in an IDEA-related suit as part of the “costs”
recoverable under § 1415(i)(B)(3). 130 This decision involves Joseph
Murphy, who, at the time of the original action, was an eighth grade
student at Arlington High School. 131 At the beginning of the 1997–1998
school year, a speech and language specialist determined Joseph had a
learning disability in which he was “severely functionally language
disordered.”132 Following this assessment, a neurologist examined Joseph
and concluded he had a “near total incapacity to process language,
written or oral.” 133 Despite the recommendation of Arlington Central
School District’s speech and language evaluator that Joseph be placed in
a residential school for language impaired students because he was
“‘high risk’ . . . both academically and emotionally,” Arlington Central
proposed an IEP in which Joseph would attend Arlington High School
and be placed in classes with other students with disabilities. 134 Joseph’s
parents then sought the opinion of Marilyn Arons, an expert in the field
of special education, to determine their son’s educational options. 135
After evaluating Joseph, reviewing the district’s assessments, and attending

Educ., No. 95 C 7172, 1996 WL 164381 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1996).
129. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332,
337–39 (2d Cir. 2005); BD v. DeBuono, 177 F. Supp. 2d 201, 207–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Mr. J. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 2d 226, 242–43 (D. Conn. 2000); Bailey v. District of
Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 888, 892 (D.D.C. 1993); Field v. Haddonfield Bd. of Educ., 769
F. Supp. 1313, 1323 (D.N.J. 1991); Doe v. Watertown Sch. Comm., 701 F. Supp. 264,
266 (D. Mass. 1988); Hirsch v. McKenzie, No. 85-3199, 1988 WL 78859 (D.D.C. July
21, 1988).
130. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2457
(2006).
131. Brief of Respondents at 8, Arlington, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 05-18).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 8–9.
135. Id. at 9.
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IEP meetings, Arons “urge[d] Arlington Central to provide Joe with
more intensive speech/language training.” 136 Arlington Central, however,
failed to grant the request. 137 Joseph’s parents refused to approve the
school district’s IEP and, thereafter, requested a due process hearing. 138
They also removed Joseph from the school, enrolled him in the Kildonan
School, a private school for learning disabled students, 139 and paid for
his tuition costs. 140
Despite not having exhausted their administrative remedies, the
Murphys filed an action under the IDEA in district court on behalf of
their son, Joseph, seeking reimbursement from Arlington Central for the
tuition costs of the private school. 141 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of the parents,
directing Arlington Central to reimburse the parents for the tuition costs
from the 1999–2000 school year to date and to continue funding Joseph’s
tuition as long as the Kildonan School was his current appropriate
placement. 142 Arlington Central appealed, and the Second Circuit
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp. 2d 354, 355
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
139. Id.; Brief of Respondents, supra note 131, at 9.
140. Arlington, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 355.
141. The impartial hearing officer (IHO) presided over the initial administrative
hearing, holding that Arlington Central’s proposed IEP for the 1998–1999 school year
was not sufficient to meet Joseph’s educational needs and that the Kildonan School was
an appropriate placement. The IHO also ordered Arlington Central to reimburse the
Murphys for both tuition fees and the costs of a private speech pathologist. Arlington
Central then timely appealed the decision to the state review officer (SRO). While the
appeal was pending, the Murphys filed an action in district court seeking a temporary
restraining order that would require the school district to pay the tuition for Kildonan
during the pendency of the appeal. Id. Before the SRO rendered a decision regarding
Joseph’s appropriate placement during the 1998–1999 year—which, at this point, was
completed—the District held an IEP meeting to determine his placement for the 1999–
2000 school year and proposed that Joseph return back to Arlington High School. The
Murphys rejected the IEP and continued to cover his tuition costs at Kildonan. In
December 1999, the SRO reached a decision, upholding the IHO’s award of tuition
reimbursement but reversing the award of reimbursement for the costs of the speech
pathologist. The Murphys then requested a due process hearing to obtain reimbursement
for tuition costs for the 1999–2000 school year, and in the still-pending district court
action, invoked the “stay put” provision to require Arlington Central to pay for the
current 1999–2000 school year tuition. The Murphys contended that Kildonan was Joseph’s
then-current placement and should remain so during the pendency of the proceedings.
Id. at 356. The District argued, on the other hand, that Joseph’s current educational
placement was Arlington High School. Id. at 357.
142. Id. at 368.
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affirmed the decision. 143 The Murphys then filed a motion in the district
court to recover $29,350 for the services provided by their educational
consultant, Marilyn Arons. 144 The district court granted reimbursement
for Aron’s services but substantially reduced the amount to $8650—
compensating only for services rendered from the commencement of the
initial due process hearing up to the district court’s ruling in the
Murphys’ favor. 145 These compensable services included facilitating the
Murphys’ understanding of the school board’s experts, reviewing the
technical materials to be used in the hearing, and preparing questions for
the cross examination of the school board’s experts. 146 The Second
Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the legislative history of the
IDEA, coupled with the dicta of House Conference Report No. 99-687,
required the court “to construe the IDEA as providing for the reimbursement
of costs such as those incurred here by Arons in conducting the expert
evaluation.” 147 Arlington Central once again appealed and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 148
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority of the Court, 149 began
the opinion stating that the fact that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant
to the Spending Clause provides sufficient guidance for the resolution of
the expert fees issue.150 The Court found that because Congress allocates
federal money to state and local educational agencies for special education
services, and because it conditions that funding upon a state’s
compliance in meeting the Act’s requirements, 151 these conditions “must

143. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir.
2002).
144. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 99 Civ. 9294(CSH),
2003 WL 21694398 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003).
145. Id. at *9–10. The court determined that Arons supplied 43 1/4 of the total
146.75 hours of consulting services between the dates of September 23, 1998 through
September 4, 1999. Therefore, 43 1/4 x $200 (Arons’s hourly rate) totaled $8650 in
fees. Id. at *9–10.
146. Brief of Respondents, supra note 131, at 12.
147. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332, 336–37 (2d
Cir. 2005).
148. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2455 (2006).
149. Members of the majority opinion included Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, Justice Souter filed
a dissenting opinion, and Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Stevens and Souter joined. Id.
150. Id. at 2458.
151. For a comprehensive listing of the substantive and procedural requirements a state
must meet in order to receive federal funds under the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (Supp.
IV 2004).
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be set out ‘unambiguously.’” 152 In other words, the IDEA must supply
clear notice of the obligation to compensate prevailing parents for expert
fees, which will enable recipients of federal money to accept or reject
these conditions “voluntarily and knowingly.” 153 The Court then looked
at the plain language of § 1415(i)(3)(B) and determined that this provision
“does not even hint that acceptance of IDEA funds makes a State
responsible for reimbursing prevailing parents for services rendered by
experts.” 154 Striking down respondents’ contention that the term costs
should be read so as to authorize the recovery of all costs associated with
the IDEA-related proceedings—including expert costs—the Court
instead concluded that “costs” is a term of art that typically does not
encompass expert fees. 155 Congress’s use of the word costs rather than
expenses, the Court added, is a further indication that § 1415(i)(3)(B) is
not an open-ended provision that would hold all participating states
liable for every type of expense incurred as a result of the litigation.
Rather, Congress was simply expanding the definition of costs to include
attorneys’ fees. 156 Therefore, absent a clear reference to expert fees
within this provision, the Court expressed that it would only look to the
list of otherwise recoverable costs. 157 These costs are set out in 28
U.S.C. § 1920, which is the “general statute governing the taxation of
costs in federal court,” and 28 U.S.C. § 1821, which provides a forty
dollar per day witness fee for court attendance. 158 When reading these
statutes and § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA together, the Court concluded
that the text “does not authorize an award of any additional expert fees,
and it certainly fails to provide the clear notice that is required under the
Spending Clause.” 159
Next, the Court addressed respondents’ argument that a General
Accounting Office (GAO) study provides a strong indication that
Congress intended recoverable costs under §1415(i)(3)(B) to include
expert fees. 160 In this study, the GAO directed the Comptroller General

152. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2459 (citation omitted).
153. Id. (citation omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2460.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2460–61; see Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-372, § 4, 100 Stat. 796, 797–98.
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to collect data on the amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses
awarded to the prevailing party in IDEA cases during a particular time
frame, the number of hours spent by personnel—including attorneys and
experts—involved in the action or proceeding, and the expenses borne
by the parties to the action or proceeding. 161 After analyzing the study’s
directive, the Court stated that respondents’ argument would have had
more persuasive force if the GAO had directed the Comptroller General
to compile data on the awards to prevailing parents for expert fees. 162
But because the study discussed experts only in the context of assessing
the number of hours they spent in IDEA cases, while making no specific
mention of expert fees, the Court concluded “it does not follow that
Congress meant for States to compensate prevailing parties for the fees
billed by these consultants.” 163 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected
respondents’ contention.
Following its review of the text of the IDEA, the Court directed its
attention to two notable Supreme Court cases dealing with statutes
containing costs provisions arguably similar to § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the
IDEA. 164 First, the Court focused on the reasoning and decision of
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc. 165 In Crawford, the petitioner
argued that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 54(d), 166 which
generally provides for the award of “costs” to the prevailing party, gives
the court discretionary authority to exceed the thirty dollar per day
witness fee limit 167 found in 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b).168 Petitioners supported
this assertion by emphasizing that while 28 U.S.C. § 1920 169 includes a
161. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2460; see H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807, 1808.
162. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2460.
163. Id. at 2460–61.
164. Id. at 2461 (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991);
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987)).
165. 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) was amended after the issuance of this decision to
increase the attendance fee for witnesses from thirty dollars to forty dollars per day. See
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 314, 104 Stat. 5115.
168. Crawford, 482 U.S. at 439; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (2000) (providing in
relevant part: “A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $30 per day for each day’s
attendance. A witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily
occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance . . . .”).
169. Section 1920 states:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained
for use in the case;
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list of costs that are taxable by the court, FRCP 54(d) supplies a
“separate source of power [to the court] to tax as costs expenses not
enumerated in § 1920.” 170 The Court disagreed, however, holding that
because the recovery of expert fees is strictly limited by § 1821 and
§ 1920, it would not infer that Congress intended to override these
statutes by a broader interpretation of FRCP 54(d). 171 In the present
case, the Court applied its analysis in Crawford and concluded that the
term costs in both § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA and FRCP 54(d) are
defined by the list of expenses enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Thus,
in recognizing the principle set forth in Crawford, the Court here refused
to permit the general reference to costs in § 1415(i)(3)(B) to essentially
nullify the specific definition of costs provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1920
absent explicit statutory authority. 172
Second, the Court relied on its decision in West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey as confirmation that the IDEA does not authorize
the award of expert fees to a prevailing party. 173 In Casey, petitioners
sought the recovery of expert fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 174 In
writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia held that § 1988 conveys
no authority to shift expert fees to the losing party; experts are only
eligible for the fees provided in § 1920 and § 1821. 175 Following the
examination of the language of § 1988, Justice Alito, in the instant case,
interpreted this fee-shifting statute as having similar wording to that of
20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B). 176 Therefore, consistent with its decision in
Casey, the Court in Arlington ruled:
To decide in favor of respondents here, we would have to interpret the virtually
identical language in 20 U.S.C. § 1415 as having exactly the opposite meaning.
Indeed, we would have to go further and hold that the relevant language in the
IDEA unambiguously means exactly the opposite of what the nearly identical

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters,
and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation
services under section 1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2000).
170. Crawford, 482 U.S. at 441.
171. Id. at 445.
172. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2462
(2006).
173. Id. (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991)).
174. Casey, 499 U.S. at 85–86.
175. Id. at 102.
176. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2462.
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language in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was held to mean in Casey. 177

The Court also responded to a particular footnote in Casey, which
substantially influenced the decision of the court of appeals to award
expert fees under § 1415(i)(3)(B). 178 In the footnote, the Casey Court
commented on petitioners’ reference to House Committee Report No.
99-687, 179 finding that the statement in the Report was “an apparent
effort to depart from ordinary meaning and to define a term of art.” 180
While this comment appeared to support respondents’ claim in Arlington
that the Casey Court viewed the Report as demonstrating a favorable
interpretation of § 1415(i)(3)(b) and as attaching a different meaning to
“costs” within the context of the IDEA, the Court disagreed. Rather,
without going into much detail, the Court stressed that the “thrust of the
footnote was simply that the term ‘attorney’s fees’ . . . is generally not
understood” to cover expert fees as well. 181 Therefore, according to the
Court, both Crawford 182 and Casey 183 reinforced the conclusion that
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) neither provides clear notice nor unambiguously authorizes
a court to award expert fees to prevailing parents. 184
Finally, the Court addressed respondents’ remaining contentions about
the fundamental purpose of the IDEA and the legislative history of the
Act. Respondents claimed that disallowing the recovery of expert fees
would contradict the overarching goals of the IDEA in providing eligible
students a FAPE and in safeguarding the ability of parents to contest a
school district’s decision that negatively impacts their child. 185 Finding
these goals to be “too general” to provide sufficient backing for
respondents’ assertion, the Court quickly disposed of their interpretation,
concluding that the IDEA “does not seek to promote these goals at the
expense of all other considerations, including fiscal considerations.” 186
Finally, respondents emphasized that a proper reading of the Conference
Committee Report clearly reveals the intent of Congress to afford
compensation of expert fees to the prevailing party. 187 The Court once
again, however, struck down respondents’ argument, declaring that
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Casey, 499 U.S. at 92 n.5); see Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332, 336–37 (2d Cir. 2005).
179. For the exact quoted language from the House Committee Report, see discussion
infra Part III.D.
180. Casey, 499 U.S. at 92 n.5.
181. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2463.
182. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc, 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987).
183. Casey, 499 U.S. at 102.
184. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2463.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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legislative history is not sufficient to supersede the overwhelming legal
authority that denies the recovery of expert fees. 188 In Spending Clause
litigation, a correct reading of a statute is not based on what Congress
intends, but rather “what the States are clearly told” with respect to the
conditions they must meet to receive federal assistance. 189 Thus, for
the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the Second Circuit, denying the recovery of expert fees under
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA. 190
B. The Dissent
In disagreeing with the majority decision of the Supreme Court,
Justice Stephen Breyer issued a powerful dissent in which he argued that
congressional intent is abundantly clear in authorizing “attorneys’ fees
as part of the costs” to include expert fees. 191 Justice Breyer began his
discussion providing two notable reasons why the statutory phrase must
be read in this manner. First, he explained, the inclusion of an award for
expert fees is exactly what Congress said it intended by the use of that

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2463–64. Justice Ginsburg concurred with the majority decision but,
nevertheless, disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of the clear notice requirement in
Spending Clause litigation. Ginsburg stated that the Court’s reference to the clear notice
requirement in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981),
should not be taken out of context. She explained: “The Court there confronted a plea to
impose an ‘unexpected condition for compliance—a new [programmatic] obligation for
participating States.’ The controversy here is lower key: It concerns not the educational
programs IDEA directs school districts to provide, but ‘the remedies available against a
noncomplying [district].’” Arlington, 126 S.Ct. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citations omitted). Ginsburg also recognized that the IDEA was enacted not only
pursuant to the Spending Clause, but to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.
For this reason she stated, the Court does not need to rely on the clear notice requirement
in reaching its conclusion. Rather, the “twin pillars” provide ample support for the
Court’s final judgment. Id. Ginsburg also noted that while it would “make good sense”
when considering the overarching goals of the IDEA to include the costs of consultants
under § 1415(i)(3)(B), Congress still did not provide specific reference to expert fees in
the IDEA as it did in other statutes. Id. at 2465; see W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83, 89 n.4 (1991) (supplying a list of thirty-four statutes in ten different titles of
the United States Code that explicitly shift both attorneys’ fees and expert fees).
Therefore, Ginsburg stressed that because the judiciary is unable to rewrite the text of the
statute, “[t]he ball . . . is properly left in Congress’ court to provide, if it so elects, for
consultant fees and testing expenses beyond those IDEA and its implementing regulations
already authorize.” Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2465 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
191. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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phrase and, second, this interpretation is in line with the basic legislative
purposes of the IDEA. 192
Regarding his first point, Justice Breyer thoroughly discussed the
legislative history of the IDEA’s cost-shifting provision, explaining that
upon Congress’s enactment of the Handicapped Children’s Protection
Act (HCPA) 193 in 1986, it was already mindful of the need to award
attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties. 194 In 1985, Senator Lowell Weicker
introduced the pertinent bill in the Senate providing for the recovery of
attorneys’ fees. 195 Thereafter, several senators introduced a new bill that
would cap attorneys’ fees but, at the same time, empower courts to award
reasonable attorneys’ fees, reasonable witness fees, and other reasonable
expenses resulting from the litigation in addition to the costs of a
prevailing parent. 196 Although some senators objected to the cap, no one
objected to the latter portion of the bill. 197 Another group of senators
then proposed an alternative bill, which would “authorize[] courts to
award ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee in addition to the costs to a parent’
who prevailed.” 198 Senator Weicker explained that this bill would
enable courts to compensate parents for whatever reasonable costs they had to
incur to fully secure what was guaranteed to them by the [EAHCA]. As in other
fee shifting statutes, it is our intent that such awards will include, at the
discretion of the court, reasonable attorney’s fees, necessary expert witness fees,
and other reasonable expenses which [are] necessary for parents to vindicate
their claim to a free appropriate public education for their handicapped
child. 199

The Senate then passed the bill without any opposition to Senator Weicker’s
statement. 200
Just as the Senate expressed clear intent to award expert fees to
prevailing parties in IDEA cases, Justice Breyer noted that the House
version of the bill reflected the same viewpoint. 201 The Committee on
Education and Labor created a substitute bill that would permit courts to
192. Id.
193. See generally Allan G. Osbourne, Jr., Commentary, Update on Attorney’s Fees
Under the IDEA, 193 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1 (2004). Congress enacted the HCPA to authorize
courts to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in an IDEA lawsuit. Id.
The HPCA amended the original version of the IDEA in response to the Supreme Court
decision of Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), which held that prevailing parties
are not entitled to the recovery of attorneys’ fees under the Act. Id.
194. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. Id.; 131 CONG. REC. 1361, 1979–80 (1985).
196. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2466–67; S. REP. No. 99-112, at 7 (1985).
197. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2467; S. REP. No. 99-112, supra note 196, at 17–18.
198. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting S. REP. No. 99-112, supra note 196, at
15–16).
199. Id. (quoting 131 CONG. REC. 21387, 21390 (1985)) (emphasis added).
200. Id.; 131 CONG. REC. 21387, 21393 (1985).
201. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2467.
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“‘award reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs’ to prevailing
parents,” explicitly stating that “‘[t]he phrase ‘expenses and costs’ includes
expenses of expert witnesses.’” 202 No member of the House objected to
this statement. When the bill reached the House floor, members of the
House introduced another bill that, in still authorizing the same award of
expert fees, would add a provision directing the Comptroller General, on
behalf of the GAO, to study and report on the fiscal impact of the costshifting provision.203 Subsequently, the House passed the bill.204 Members
of both the House and Senate then convened to discuss and decide on the
two bills. 205 During this meeting, they created a Conference Committee
Report that included the text of the new bill, which was a combination of
the House bill’s GAO provision and the cost-shifting provisions of both
the House and Senate’s respective bills. 206 Included in the Report was
the statement that the “‘conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as
part of the costs’ include . . . fees of expert witnesses.’” 207 The House
and Senate then, without opposition to this statement, adopted the newly
crafted bill. 208 Thus, according to Justice Breyer, in approving the
Report and in adopting the bill, Congress made its intent perfectly clear
that the costs provision unquestionably would encompass expert fees. 209
Justice Breyer then highlighted the IDEA’s fundamental purpose of
guaranteeing each child a FAPE to support his contention that Congress
intended to grant prevailing parents the opportunity to recover expert
fees. Justice Breyer explained that because the IDEA’s ultimate goal is
to afford every eligible child specially designed instruction under the Act
at no cost to parents, forcing parents to shoulder the burden of additional
costs in an IDEA case would run completely contrary to the Act’s
practical significance. 210 Furthermore, the IDEA encourages meaningful
parent participation in every stage of the child’s education and
enumerates specific procedural protections to “assure[] parents that they
may question a school district’s decisions about what is ‘appropriate’ for

202. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 5 (1985)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2467–68.
207. Id. at 2468 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807, 1808).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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their child.”211 Thus, Justice Breyer emphasized, disallowing reimbursement
for expert fees will diminish the parents’ faith in the IDEA as a means to
successfully challenge the school district with an equal basis of knowledge
and expertise.
Justice Breyer also noted that experts are both necessary and
expensive. 212 Because the school district often retains many of its
experts that are already on the staff, the “costs of experts may not make
much of a dent in a school district’s budget.” 213 However, Justice
Breyer stressed, the denial of an award of costs may substantially affect
a parent’s ability to utilize the services of experts in an action against a
school district—and low-income parents may be forced to surrender
their right altogether. 214 Moreover, according to Justice Breyer, the
Court’s concern that allowing the recovery of expert fees will essentially
open the floodgates to parents receiving awards of “indeterminate
magnitude, untethered to compensable harm” is unfounded. 215
Justice Breyer also did not find convincing the majority’s argument
that the IDEA was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause and that any
conditions Congress attached to federal funding must be set out
“unambiguously.” While conceding that the IDEA’s costs provision
“does not clearly tell the States that they must pay expert fees to
prevailing parents,” Justice Breyer nevertheless disagreed with the
inflexible approach taken by the Court in requiring the Act to provide
“clear notice” to the states. 216 He noted that the Court has yet to decide
a case involving a Spending Clause statute where it has required that
every spending detail be “spelled out with unusual clarity.” 217 Rather,
the text of the statute must simply enable a state to “assess its meanings
in terms of basic legislative purpose.” 218 Justice Breyer expressed,
however, that irrespective of whether Congress set out such conditions
“unambiguously” in the present case, the Court has held in a prior IDEArelated case that this requirement “does not necessarily apply to
legislation setting forth ‘the remedies available against a noncomplying
State.’” 219 Therefore, the majority’s mandate for linguistic clarity in the
IDEA’s costs provision to warrant the award of expert fees is misplaced;
such a reading of the Act “risk[s] a set of judicial interpretations that can
211. Id. at 2468–69.
212. Id. at 2469.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2471 (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 190–91 (2001) (Souter,
J., concurring)).
216. Id. at 2470.
217. Id. at 2470–71.
218. Id. at 2471.
219. Id. at 2471 (citation omitted).
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prevent the program, overall, from achieving its basic objectives or that
might well reduce a program in its details to incoherence.” 220
Justice Breyer then addressed how the Court read the IDEA’s costs
provision as implicitly referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which enumerates
the types of costs taxable by a federal court. Although this may be a
possible reading of § 1415(i)(3)(B), Justice Breyer explained, it is not
the only one. 221 Instead, one can read the provision as being twofold:
granting a “general authority to award costs” and granting the specific
authority to award attorneys’ fees in addition to those costs. 222 Reading
the statute in this manner, according to Justice Breyer, may be
“linguistically the less natural,” but it is still “legislatively the more
likely.”223 Furthermore, the majority’s reading of the provision as necessarily
including the costs listed in § 1920 is inconsistent for an additional
reason. Because § 1920 is a federal cost-shifting statute, it only applies
in federal courts. Therefore, Justice Breyer argued, it seems contrary to
Congress’s vision of the IDEA that a federal statute would define the
meaning of “costs” for all IDEA cases when much of IDEA-related legal
activity occurs in administrative and state court proceedings.224
Finally, Justice Breyer discussed the Court’s “most persuasive
argument,” which focused on the word costs as being a term of art. 225
Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Court has traditionally excluded
expert fees from the scope of the word costs and has interpreted the term
in a similar manner in other cost-shifting statutes. 226 However, he noted
that the Court recognized in the Casey decision that Congress is free to
redefine terms of art, even through a statutory provision such as
Conference Committee Report No. 99-687. 227 But the present case is
different, Justice Breyer reasoned, because Congress did not intend costs
to be used as a term of art as it was in the Casey decision. 228 Rather,
Congress intended the word costs to include additional expenses. This is
evident, Justice Breyer concluded, based on Congress’s acceptance of the
GAO’s briefing report which stated that “[p]arents can receive reimbursement
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 2471.
Id. at 2472.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2472–73.
Id. at 2473.
Id.
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from state or local education agencies for . . . attorney fees and related
expenses if they are the prevailing party” and “[e]xpert witness fees . . .
are [an] example[] of reimbursable expenses.” 229 Thus, following his
analysis of the legislative history of the IDEA, the basic purpose of the
Act, and the proper reading of the statutory language of the costs
provision, Justice Breyer found that the majority’s decision to deny the
recovery of expert fees to prevailing parents in an IDEA case is
incorrect, for it “divorces law from life.” 230
C. Understanding the Arlington Court’s Choice of
Statutory Interpretation
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Arlington illustrate the
multitude of issues and considerations underlying the application of the
costs provision of the IDEA. Although the decision stands for the exclusion
of expert fees as recoverable costs under 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B), it
also represents something much more significant: Arlington now marks
the Supreme Court’s departure from securing a free appropriate public
education for a child with a disability. Before discussing how the
majority has departed from its prior rulings involving eligible children
under the IDEA as well as the resulting policy implications of this
decision, it is first necessary to understand why the majority adopted a
strict reading of § 1415(i)(3)(B) and refused to look beyond the explicit
terms of the provision to guide its decisionmaking. Thus, an examination of
the competing methodologies the Supreme Court Justices use when
interpreting statutory law is important to develop that understanding. 231

229. Id. at 2474 (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: THE
ATTORNEY FEE PROVISION OF PUBLIC LAW 99-372, at 13 (1989)).
230. Id. at 2475.
231. This Comment does not attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the
various doctrines of statutory interpretation utilized by the Supreme Court, because
offering a general overview of the Court’s approaches would hardly do justice to such an
expansive and intricate subject. Rather, a discussion will follow explaining two dominant, yet
competing, approaches to statutory interpretation that appear to be controlling in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Arlington. However, note that much scholarly
attention centers on the Supreme Court’s canons of statutory interpretation, the benefits and
drawbacks of the different approaches, and how these methods substantially affect the
outcomes of statutory holdings. For an excellent discussion of prominent models of
statutory interpretation employed by the Supreme Court, see Note, Intent, Clear
Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95
HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982). See also John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent,
91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419–420 (2005) (discussing the shift in Supreme Court doctrines of
statutory interpretation in the past two decades from one of “classical intentionalism” to
one of “textualism” which has made a profound effect on academic writing and judicial
behavior).
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1. Methods of Statutory Interpretation
The concept of statutory construction, or a federal court’s
interpretation of statutory language to ascertain Congress’s true intention
of the law, symbolizes a balancing of powers of the three branches of
government. While it is Congress’s duty to enact federal law and policy,
the Supreme Court has reserved to itself and the other federal courts,
since the decision of Marbury v. Madison, 232 the power to say what the
law means. 233 Therefore, the task of statutory interpretation is a shared
responsibility among legislators, other elected officials, bureaucrats, and
judges, which reinforces the constitutional scheme of separation of
powers. 234 However, the line between making the law and determining
what the law means becomes muddled when congressional intent is not
clear on the face of the statute. As a result, the Supreme Court has
historically resorted to doctrines of statutory interpretation to decipher
legislative language in the context of specific factual issues when the
federal statute at issue is facially ambiguous and unclear. 235
Although many canons of statutory interpretation exist, the Supreme
Court has predominantly employed two distinct, competing approaches
when deciding issues implicating a vague or ambiguous statute. 236
These interpretative methodologies include what legal scholars and critics
refer to as classical intentionalism,237 or purposivism,238 and textualism.239
232. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule.”).
233. Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters:
Statutory Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning
Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955, 959 (2005).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 958 (describing that Supreme Court has followed the English rule in
statutory interpretation, considering both the current plain meaning and prior legal
context).
236. For an outline of certain canons of statutory construction “that presuppose
Congress’s knowledge of and responsiveness to Court decisions,” see Michael E.
Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme
Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 428 (1992).
237. For clarity, this Comment will refer to the view that the court must consider
the legislative history and the statute’s goals and purposes in conjunction with the
explicit wording of the statute for further evidence of Congress’s intent as “classical
intentionalism.” See Manning, supra note 231.
238. See Craig, supra note 233, at 960–61 (referring to the purposivist approach as
having the ultimate goal of effectuating congressional intent that preserves the balance of
power between the legislative and judicial branches).

285

REED POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

4/22/2008 1:42:35 PM

Classical intentionalism, a philosophy most often associated with its
committed follower on the Supreme Court, Justice John Paul Stevens,
posits “the idea that legislation is a purposive act” in which Congress
formulates relatively coherent policy objectives but often expresses those
policies inaccurately in statutory text.240 Thus, according to classical
intentionalists, it is the province of the judiciary to effectuate legislative
intent by uncovering Congress’s unexpressed background intentions,
purposes, or goals relating to the statutory language at issue. Put differently,
classical intentionalists emphasize the “fallibility of legislative
expression.”241 Due to the “[l]imits on human foresight, imprecision in
the tools of linguistic expression, and constraints on legislative resources,”
Congress inevitably drafts generally worded text that fails to explain the
variety of situations that may invoke the given statute.242 Therefore, if a
statute’s literal interpretation produces a result that appears to be in
contravention with the law’s background purpose, classical
intentionalists assume that Congress “spoke clearly but inaccurately” in
selecting the words to express its aims. 243 Consequently, proponents of this
theory advocate making use of the statute’s legislative history,
committee hearings, conference reports, and prior case law as a means to
provide contextual clarity to an otherwise ambiguous statutory term or
phrase.
Textualism, in contrast, represents a theory of statutory interpretation
that is diametrically opposed to classical intentionalism. As a “surrogate
for actual legislative intent,” 244 textualism emphasizes a literalist reading
of statutory terms in which judges must “give precedence to semantic
context . . . [and] enforce the conventional meaning of a clear text,” even
if it does not appear to align properly with the statute’s overarching
purpose.245 When discerning the meaning of unclear text, many textualist
judges, including Justice Scalia of the Supreme Court, refuse to treat
legislative history or references to explanations found in legislative
debates and reports as authoritative evidence of congressional intent.
Rather, proponents of this philosophy will only resort to “dictionary
definitions, the statutory context, or . . . canons of construction” to supplement

239. See generally John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory
Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009 (2006); Manning, supra note 231.
240. Manning, supra note 239, at 2009.
241. Id. at 2009–10.
242. Id. at 2010.
243. Id.
244. Note, supra note 231, at 894.
245. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 3–4 (2001).
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their interpretation. 246 To support their position, textualists explain that
due to the inherent complexity of the legislative process, interpreters
cannot easily determine whether Congress proscribed a meaning to the
written text apart from that which it expressly included in the statute. 247
For this reason, judges must not assume the role of the legislator by
attributing greater meaning to the literal words of a statute, for doing so
would amount to rewriting the law duly enacted by Congress. 248
Instead, judges must strictly adhere to the statute’s “chosen words” and
assume that “what Congress enacts is precisely what Congress
intends.” 249
Before the addition of Justice Scalia to the Supreme Court in 1986, the
Court traditionally used statutory tools of construction that focused on
“overall statutory structure, statutory goals and purposes, and legislative
history” to properly give effect to congressional intent. 250 However,
over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has witnessed a noticeable
change in posture in which its seemingly dominant method of statutory
interpretation has centered less on the contextualization of a statute’s
language and more on the literal meaning of its express terms. 251 This
recent shift toward textualism in the Supreme Court has, in turn,
particularly influenced decisions involving expert fees.
2. Deciphering the Meaning of the Expert Fees Provision
As a precursor to the expert fees issue in Arlington, the Supreme
Court’s decision of West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey
supplies perhaps the clearest illustration of the conflict between the
textualist and classical intentionalist readings of a statute. 252 In addition,
it is interesting to note that when juxtaposing the Casey and Arlington

246. Ernest Gellhorn, Justice Breyer on Statutory Review and Interpretation, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 755, 758 (1995).
247. Manning, supra note 231, at 420.
248. Note, supra note 231, at 895.
249. Id.
250. Craig, supra note 233, at 961, 980.
251. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of
Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v.
Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 689 (1992);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624–25 (1990);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1598–99 (1991).
252. 499 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1991).
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decisions, the majority and dissenting opinions demonstrate remarkable
similarities in their overall treatment of the respective cases. However,
while Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Arlington gains textualist
support from Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Casey, both dissenting opinions
nevertheless offer powerful justification for reading unclear statutory
text in a light favorable to congressional intent. And, when mindful of
Congress’s paramount objective in enacting the IDEA and the clarity of
its explanations specifically addressing the recovery of expert fees,
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Arlington provides even stronger rationale for
why the Supreme Court erred in its decision by ignoring persuasive
evidence of Congress’s actual purpose.
As previously mentioned, 253 Casey involved the question of whether
plaintiffs in certain types of civil rights actions are entitled to recover
expert fees as part of the “attorney’s fees” awardable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. 254 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion examined the language of
the provision and concluded that attorneys’ fees and expert fees are
distinct items of expense. Because the statute made no express mention
of expert fees, the Court could not enlarge the statute to include within
its scope that which Congress omitted, since doing so would “transcend[]
the judicial function.” 255 Scalia supported this argument by referencing
thirty-four statutes that explicitly accounted for both attorneys’ fees and
expert fees as separate types of recovery. 256 Although recognizing that
the denial of expert fees made the policy of § 1988 inconsistent with
other statutes that preceded § 1988 and explicitly shifted such fees,
Scalia remained steadfast to his textualist position, stating that when
Congress provides for a particular meaning of a term, “it is not [the
Court’s] function to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy
and to treat alike subjects that different Congresses have chosen to treat
differently.” 257 As a result, the Court held that due to the absence of
express statutory authority, § 1988 does not permit the shifting of expert
fees. 258
Just as Justice Scalia approached the expert fees issue from a purely
textualist standpoint, Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Arlington also
advanced this form of reasoning to ultimately reach the same conclusion.259
Justice Alito alluded to the decisions of Casey and Crawford to reinforce
his argument that because the IDEA does not explicitly authorize
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
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Casey, 499 U.S. at 84.
Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
Id. at 88–90.
Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 102.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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prevailing parents to recover expert fees, the Court could not give effect
to a meaning beyond that specifically provided in the provision’s literal
language. While completely glossing over the policy reasons for the
IDEA’s enactment, Justice Alito focused largely on the text of the
statute, concluding that in Spending Clause legislation, Congress must
clearly identify the conditions attached to those states receiving federal
money. However, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted in a concurring
opinion, Congress did not enact the IDEA pursuant only to Spending
Clause authority. 260 Rather, it was also enacted pursuant to Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment as a means to aid the states in complying
with their constitutional obligations of providing children with a
FAPE. 261 Therefore, by framing the expert fees issue as purely invoking
the Spending Clause, Justice Alito stripped the IDEA entirely of its
contextual meaning, refusing to take into account other provisions
establishing the right to expert assistance in IDEA proceedings as well as
the Act’s legislative history in which members of Congress clearly
communicated their intent for expert fees to be recoverable costs under
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). Not surprisingly, Alito’s particular reliance on the
literal text of § 1988 as having “virtually identical language” as that of
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) to strengthen his final decision is analogous to Scalia’s
dependence on other fee-shifting statutes that either expressly permitted
or denied expert fees to conclude the same. 262 Therefore, although the
resulting effect of Scalia’s reasoning in Casey was completely contradictory
to the aim of affording protections for civil rights litigants under § 1988,
and while Alito’s decision in Arlington completely avoided the significance
of the IDEA in securing added protections to parents of children with
disabilities, both chose to sacrifice consistency in policy for the sake of
judicial deference to Congress’s duly enacted legislation—even though
such a decision may not have been Congress’s vision in the least.
Although a thoughtful consideration of the plain text of a federal
statute and its pattern of usage is a necessary starting point when
resolving a dispute, both Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer would not
end the analysis there. In his dissent in Casey, Justice Stevens criticized
the Court for “put[ting] on its thick grammarian’s spectacles and
ignor[ing] the available evidence of congressional purpose and the
260. See supra note 190.
261. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2006)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 2462.
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teaching of prior cases.” 263 He explained that it makes little sense to
permit attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action, but
simultaneously deny fee recovery for experts whose services were
essential and provided a substitute for the time spent by an attorney. 264
Moreover, he warned that to permit the reimbursement for other
categories of expenses and yet deny the same for expert fees “is both
arbitrary and contrary to the broad remedial purpose that inspired the
fee-shifting provision of § 1988.” 265 Justice Stevens emphasized that the
intention behind the congressional enactment of § 1988 was to overturn
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, which had
disallowed the earlier practice of shifting attorneys’ fees and expert fees
in certain federal cases. 266 To support his argument, Justice Stevens
referred to House and Senate Committee hearings and reports that all
underscored Congress’s intention to shift costs under § 1988, including
expert witness fees. 267 Thus, Justice Stevens inferred that Congress
sought to return the courts to their pre-Alyeska practice of shifting fees in
civil rights cases so that those acting as private attorneys general could
be made “whole again,” which would, in turn, encourage public interest
litigation. 268 And, shortly after the decision this inference proved true:
Congress amended § 1988, which effectively abrogated Casey. 269
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer adopted a classical intentionalist
reading of § 1415(i)(3)(B) in Arlington and refused to view the plain
meaning of the costs provision from a literalist standpoint. Breyer
instead rooted his analysis in the Act’s underlying purposes and drafting
history to give proper context to § 1415(i)(3)(B). 270 Breyer found that
the majority’s decision to overlook Congress’s objective to afford
prevailing parents the ability to recover expert fees essentially stripped
the Act of its practical significance.271 By disallowing such reimbursement,
parents would no longer have the same participatory rights and
procedural protections, which is a “far cry from the level playing field
that Congress envisioned.” 272 Similar to Stevens’s approach in Casey

263. Casey, 499 U.S. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 107.
265. Id. at 107–08.
266. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 269
(1975)).
267. Casey, 499 U.S. at 108–11.
268. Id. at 109, 111.
269. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2000)).
270. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
271. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2469
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 2470.
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regarding the expert fees issue, Breyer explained that the majority’s
literal reading of the word costs in Arlington distorted the actual
meaning of the term and rendered the remaining statutory provisions
inconsistent. He emphasized that such a mechanical application of the
term for purposes of “linguistic clarity” cannot assist the courts in reaching
sound results. 273 By abandoning all consideration of congressional floor
debates, hearing testimony, and committee reports, the Court did a
disservice to not just those protected under the statute, but to those who
created and enacted that statute as well. Breyer also implied that this
approach inhibited the courts from carrying out an important and
necessary function: the interpretation of statutory law where Congress’s
work product suffered from an omission or inadvertent error.
While some textualists might argue that the omission of the phrase
“expert witness fees” could hardly be a mistake, given the fact that
Congress addressed the expert fees issue in committee reports and
hearings prior to the IDEA’s enactment and expressly included the
phrase “expert fees” in prior fee-shifting statutes, Justices Breyer and
Stevens would disagree with this assessment. Rather, as Justice Stevens
admonished in Casey, “The fact that Congress has consistently provided
for the inclusion of expert witness fees in fee-shifting statutes . . . is a
weak reed on which to rest the conclusion that the omission of such a
provision represents a deliberate decision to forbid such awards.” 274 The
Court must instead, according to both Justices, allow for the possibility
of a different interpretation of the costs provision that is faithful to true
congressional intent. Thus, in criticizing the Court’s rigid approach to
the expert fees issue, Justice Breyer illustrated how this inflexibility did
little justice to the IDEA’s fundamental goals of securing procedural and
substantive protections for parents and their children. Now, just as the
civil rights litigants had to await congressional amendment of § 1988,
parents must also rely on the revision of § 1415(i)(3)(B) to undo the
harm imposed by the majority’s decision.
D. Why the Arlington Court Made the Wrong Decision
When retracing the Supreme Court’s rather liberal approach to
statutory interpretation in some of its recent decisions involving the
273. See id. at 2471; see also Gellhorn, supra note 246, at 764.
274. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115–16 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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IDEA, the strictly textualist method the Court applied in Arlington
seems both arbitrary and improper. This is especially evident in light of
Congress’s goal of entrusting the Supreme Court with the responsibility
of interpreting the provisions of the IDEA when disputes arise between
parents and school districts and its vision that the core purposes of the
Act would guide that interpretation. One of those purposes is to provide
children with disabilities an appropriate education at no cost to their
parents.
Until recently, the Supreme Court has been faithful to its mission of
carrying out Congress’s instruction and has aligned its reasoning and
decisions in IDEA cases with the aim of maintaining the Act’s
substantive and procedural protections. 275 In doing so, the Court,
despite its recent shift toward textualism, has placed considerable weight
on the Act’s legislative history to properly interpret the meaning
Congress attached to specific terms in the statute. For instance, in
Rowley, the Court strongly relied upon the Senate and House Reports to
determine the meaning of an “appropriate” education because Congress
never provided a substantive definition of the term in the IDEA. 276 The
Senate Report discussed statistics compiled by the Bureau of Education
for the Handicapped, showing that only 3.9 of eight million children
with disabilities were receiving an “appropriate education” in 1975. 277
This report also included a table illustrating the number of children
“served” and the number of those “unserved” in 1975, and a similar
discussion and table appeared in the House Report as well. 278 The
Rowley Court thoroughly discussed these reports in its decision to
demonstrate that Congress sought to provide children under the Act with
an “appropriate” education conferring some educational benefit, rather
than one that would maximize each student’s potential. The Court
emphasized the importance of looking to the Act’s legislative history
when attempting to define a statutory term, such as “appropriate”
education, and explained that “[l]ike many statutory definitions, this one
tends toward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive, but that is
scarcely a reason for abandoning the quest for legislative intent.”279 The
Court then concluded that “the Senate and House Reports unmistakably
disclose Congress’[s] perception of the type of education required by the
Act . . . .” 280
275.
276.
277.
278.
(1975)).
279.
280.

292

See supra Part III.C–D.
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 195–97 (1982).
Id. at 195 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975)).
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, at 11–12
Id. at 188.
Id. at 197.

REED POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

[VOL. 45: 251, 2008]

4/22/2008 1:42:35 PM

Is a Free Appropriate Public Education Free?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

This comprehensive reading and application of Congress’s statements
in the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Rowley, however, was
hardly the technique employed by the majority in Arlington. With the
exception of the dissent, the Arlington Court barely even mentioned the
drafting history of the IDEA’s costs provision, including the bills
introduced by the Senate and the House discussing the recovery of costs,
to gain insight into the congressional intent behind its wording of the
provision. 281 The only time the Court did discuss an aspect of the
legislative history of this provision was in its reference to the GAO
Report. 282 While it seems that Congress’s instruction to the GAO to
study the “attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses” awarded to prevailing
parties in IDEA cases, including the hours spent by attorneys and
consultants, provides a clear indication that Congress expected
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA to be read so as to include expert costs, the
majority found this interpretation to be “incorrect.” The Court simply
concluded that having knowledge of the costs incurred by parties in an
IDEA suit might be useful in considering future procedural or feeshifting amendments. Additionally, because the GAO study involved
obtaining data on expenses that could not be taxed as costs, the majority
found that it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended the
recovery of expert fees.
Even if Congress was unclear in its purpose behind the
implementation of the GAO Report, it is still markedly apparent that
Congress intended expert fees to be included as recoverable costs
because it explicitly said so in Conference Committee Report No.
99-687. 283 However, the Court in Arlington overlooked the importance
of this Report and refused to grant any leeway in interpreting the
meaning of “costs,” despite its forthright acceptance in Rowley of using
legislative history as a means to clarify an otherwise ambiguous term.
Whereas the Rowley Court stressed that a statutory term that “tends
toward the cryptic” does not provide an excuse for “abandoning the
quest for legislative intent,” the Court here concluded the opposite in
stating that the legislative history was not enough to render a decision
favorable to the Murphys. Thus, the Court, in favoring a more literal
reading of the statute, departed from the position it assumed in Rowley
281. For a discussion on Justice Breyer’s Arlington dissent, see discussion supra
Part IV.B.
282. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
283. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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by failing to consult the relevant legislative history to inform its analysis
on the proper meaning of an important term.
Not only did the Supreme Court demonstrate a change in posture with
respect to the weight given to the IDEA’s legislative history, but it also
fell short in its once consistent commitment to ensuring that every
eligible child receives a FAPE. For example, in Cedar Rapids Community
School District v. Garret F., the Court sought to uphold Congress’s
vision of providing disabled children meaningful access to education in
its broad interpretation of the “related services” provision of the
IDEA. 284 Rather than construing services provided by a qualified school
nurse as excludable “medical services” under the Act, the Court found,
in keeping with the purpose of the IDEA, that “related services” did
encompass the type of care at issue in the case, despite the fact that the
provision did not provide a clear definition of the phrase. 285 Likewise,
in School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, the
Supreme Court found that the IDEA confers broad discretion to grant
appropriate relief. 286 Noting that the term appropriate was not specified
in the Act, the Court nevertheless authorized the reimbursement of
tuition fees to parents who unilaterally placed their child in a private
school after the school district’s IEP had inappropriately placed the child
in a public school. 287 In justifying its decision, the Court opined that
“[a]bsent other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the
relief is to be ‘appropriate’ in light of the purpose of the Act.” 288 As a
successor to Burlington, Florence County School District Four v. Carter
also signified the Supreme Court’s commitment to the IDEA’s promise
of a FAPE when it held that parents are entitled to reimbursement of
tuition costs resulting from their child’s placement in a private school
regardless of whether the school is approved by the state or complies

284. 526 U.S. 66, 73 (1999); see also Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S.
883, 891 (1984) (holding that a service that permits a child with a disability to remain at
school during the day is necessary to provide the child with the meaningful access to
education that Congress intended).
285. Garret F., 526 U.S. at 74 n.6. Here, the student was paralyzed from the neck
down and required the use of a ventilator and other health services to attend school. Id.
at 69. The student’s mother requested that the school district maintain financial
responsibility for the healthcare services he required during the school day; however, the
district disagreed. Id. at 70. In finding for the student, the Supreme Court held that the
IDEA’s definition of “related services” includes ventilator services that can be administered
by a school nurse. Therefore, the Court concluded that the district had a financial
responsibility under the IDEA to provide all the services in dispute to the student during
the school day. Id. at 77–79.
286. 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985).
287. Id. at 369.
288. Id.
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with all the terms set forth in the IDEA. 289 The Court found that while
this holding may result in a significant financial burden on a school
district that produces an inappropriate IEP for the given child, to read the
relevant provision as barring reimbursement in this case “would defeat
[the] statutory purpose.” 290
Together, these past decisions illustrate how the Supreme Court has
turned to the underlying purposes of the IDEA to give meaning to a
relevant term or phrase that is otherwise ambiguous standing alone.
However, the Arlington Court took the opposite approach by
circumventing the legislative purpose of the IDEA when it defined the
meaning of “costs.” This avoidance is especially evident from the
Court’s rejection of the Murphys’ argument that their interpretation of
the IDEA furthers the Act’s overarching goals of providing a FAPE to
all children with disabilities and safeguarding parents’ rights to
challenge a school district’s decision. The Court simply determined
these goals to be “too general” to provide a deeper understanding of the
term costs. Although the Supreme Court’s increasingly textualist
approach to statutory interpretation provides an explanation of why it
decided Arlington in this manner, such a conclusion still does not make
sense in light of the Court’s past decisions which used a far more liberal
approach to clarify the meaning of a vague term. Moreover, the Arlington
decision now impedes, rather than advances, the goals of the IDEA by
imposing a significant obstacle for low-income parents, especially those
having children with ASD, who seek to challenge the school district.
This reality is especially poignant when taking into account the Court’s
recent decision of Schaffer v. Weast. 291
E. Schaffer v. Weast in Context
At first glance, Schaffer v. Weast represents the Supreme Court’s
concise holding that parents who challenge the appropriateness of their
child’s IEP in an IDEA hearing must bear the burden of proof, unless
state law specifies otherwise. 292 This holding, in isolation, does not
289. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993).
290. Id. at 13–14.
291. 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
292. Id. at 62. To clarify, the burden of proof in an administrative hearing is placed
on the party seeking relief. Although the burden of proof was on the child’s parents in
Schaffer because they brought the claim against the school district, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor noted that the “rule applies with equal effect” to school districts seeking to
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seem to contravene the underlying purposes of the IDEA because
parents still retain all the procedural protections afforded by the Act.
However, when viewing Schaffer in conjunction with the decision in
Arlington, some of these parental safeguards seem to quickly dissipate.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in writing for the majority, attempted
to dispel the notion that the school district bears a “unique informational
advantage” by reiterating that the IDEA guarantees parents the right to
review all of the school’s records relating to their child. 293 The problem,
though, is not necessarily access to the school district’s information;
rather, the problem stems from the parents’ inability to synthesize that
information without a special education expert. 294 Expert assistance is
critical to parents in IDEA cases because typically neither the parents
nor their respective attorneys are “equipped to advocate the specifics” of
what constitutes an appropriate IEP that is designed to provide the child
with a FAPE. 295 It is also largely undisputed that expert testimony is of
critical importance to the school district as well; but the difference is that
for the latter party, experts are readily available for consultation. School
districts employ internal experts who develop special education programs
for disabled students and have the advantage of working directly with
the child. 296 When a dispute arises regarding the child’s IEP, the school
district depends on these experts, which may include special education
teachers, psychologists, guidance counselors, and other specialists, to
testify on behalf of the school district’s position. 297 Parents, on the other
hand, do not have this luxury.
In Schaffer, Justice O’Connor addressed this imbalance of expertise
by noting that parents are not left without “an expert with the firepower
to match the opposition” 298 because the IDEA provides parents the right
to an independent educational evaluation (IEE) of their child at public

challenge an IEP. Id. Also, Justice O’Connor explained that in this case, the pertinent
question was with regard to which party bore the burden of persuasion. Because the
parent’s evidence and the school district’s evidence were in equipoise (evenly balanced),
the Court did not have to direct its attention to who properly bore the burden of
production. Id. at 56. For a detailed commentary on Schaffer v. Weast, see Allan G.
Osbourne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, The Burden of Proof in Special Education Hearings:
Schaffer v. Weast, 200 ED. L. REP. 1 (2005).
293. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2004).
294. Brief of Respondents at 23, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy,
126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006) (No. 05-18).
295. Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1036 (8th Cir. 2003) (Pratt, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the need for expert witness testimony on behalf of the child’s
parents in an IDEA suit and how denying the recovery of expert fees will foreclose the
opportunity of many low-income families to successfully litigate their claim).
296. Id.
297. Id.; Brief of Respondents, supra note 294, at 23.
298. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61.
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expense. 299 However, obtaining an IEE does not extinguish the need for
retaining an expert. An IEE may include an evaluation of the child’s
academic and cognitive skills as well as any other skill related to the
child’s educational needs. 300 But the evaluation likely stops there. The
IDEA does not require evaluators to review the evidence the school
district will use in the due process hearing, develop questions for the
cross examination of the district’s experts, or even testify on behalf of
the parents at the hearing. 301 Moreover, even if the evaluator were to
advise the parents or testify on their behalf, there is no requirement that
the parents receive these services at public expense. 302
Now, not only do parents bringing an action under the IDEA have to
supply sufficient evidence showing the inadequacy of their child’s IEP
to meet their burden of proof, they also have to bear the expense of
hiring an expert even if they receive a favorable judgment. For lowincome parents, the cost of retaining an expert is a considerable expense,
and since parents who win against the school district generally do not
receive compensatory damages, there is no surplus of money resulting
from the judgment to offset the fees of the expert. 303 Furthermore,
because expert testimony is, more often than not, a necessary element in
IDEA due process hearings, parents who lack the resources to fund an
expert are “left with nothing but their attorney to protect their rights” and
the expert’s testimony on behalf of the school district “goes unchallenged.”304
Therefore, Schaffer’s placement of the burden of proof on parents who
attempt to challenge the school district coupled with Arlington’s denial
of the recovery of expert fees produces a serious dilemma for lowincome parents: they must either relinquish their right to challenge the
school district or place themselves in financial risk by having to shoulder
the costs of an expert.

299. Id.
300. Wayne Steedman, Independent Educational Evaluations: What? Why? How?
Who Pays?, http://www.wrightslaw.com/info/test.iee.steedman.htm (last visited Feb. 29,
2008).
301. Brief of Respondents, supra note 294, at 24.
302. Id.
303. For a discussion on why compensatory damages are not awarded to prevailing
parties in IDEA lawsuits, see Angela Hamilton, Comment, Damage Control: Promoting
the Goals of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act by Foreclosing Compensatory
Damage Awards, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 659.
304. Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1036 (8th Cir. 2003) (Pratt, J.,
dissenting).
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V. THE AFTERMATH OF ARLINGTON
A. The Impact on Children with ASD
While the Schaffer and Arlington decisions will undoubtedly affect
low-income parents who have children with any type of disability, this
Comment argues that low-income parents of children with ASD may
face even greater setbacks. 305 As previously mentioned, there is no cure
for autism and there is no single agreed upon intervention program that
has been proven to yield positive results for all children with the
disability. Despite these uncertainties, however, one thing is known:
time is of the essence. Following the child’s diagnosis, experts advise
parents to begin intensive treatment “as soon as possible, while the
child’s mind is malleable and the developmental intervention may have
the best chance of achieving optimal results.” 306 Thus, the immediacy of
the situation causes parents of a child with ASD to look to the school
district for support, entrusting its staff with the responsibility of
developing and implementing an IEP that is designed to benefit their
child and provide him or her with a FAPE. But if the school district fails
to evaluate all areas of the child’s disability and, subsequently, produces
an inappropriate IEP, the result will leave indelible marks. 307 The child
may significantly regress as a result of improper treatment, and it may
take twice as long to recoup the skills that he or she already possessed—
not to mention the child may already be at a lower educational level than
other children of the same age. 308
Because of the complexity of the disorder, in which every child
displays a unique combination of communicative and behavioral
characteristics, it is unlikely that parents challenging a school district’s
educational decision will be able to successfully advocate for their child
without the help of an expert. 309 In many respects, this is due to the fact
that the parents are unable to regularly observe their child throughout the
day in a school setting and, thus, may not be able to differentiate which,
if any, intervention strategies are promoting positive outcomes for their
child and which ones are not. Moreover, because a common attribute of

305. See discussion supra Part II.
306. AutismPro, Autism FAQs, http://www.autismpro.com/aboutautismfaq.php
(last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
307. See, e.g., Porter v. Bd. of Trs., 307 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
that the school district’s failure to provide an autistic boy a FAPE resulted in significant,
irreparable deficiencies to his educational, social, and physical well-being).
308. Systematic Treatment of Autism and Related Disorders, STAR Information
Series: Extended School Year Information, http://www.starautism.louisville.edu/images/
pdf/ESY.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
309. See Mandlawitz, supra note 39, at 497.
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the disorder is the child’s inability to fully communicate his or her
emotions and needs, the parents may be without the help of their child’s
input when trying to point out the deficiencies in the school district’s
program. For these reasons, parents of children with ASD require the
assistance of experts that are knowledgeable about the disorder, are able
to assess the specific needs of their child, and can determine whether the
school has developed an appropriate, individually tailored program that
will permit the child to benefit from his or her educational experience.
Unfortunately, the Arlington decision now prevents parents of children
with ASD from recovering nonattorney expert fees if they prevail in
litigation against the school district. While some parents will not be
dissuaded from pursuing an IDEA lawsuit by the inability to recover
expert fees, many parents of children with ASD will not have such an
opportunity because they will not have the financial backing to fund an
expert. According to the Special Education Elementary Longitudinal
Study (SEELS) conducted by the United States Department of Education
in 2002, approximately fifty-one percent of families with children with
ASD have a yearly income of less than $50,000, and 16.3% of those
families have an annual household income of less than $20,000. 310
These statistics clearly indicate that a substantial number of families
with children with ASD do not have an income that will allow for
additional expenditures such as expert fees. As Justice Breyer admonished,
while the costs of experts “may not make much of a dent in a school
district’s budget,” the same cannot be said for low-income parents who
will likely be unable to cover such costs, even if the fee is nominal. 311
Thus, although parents have uniformly prevailed in their IDEA claims
when the school district’s program was deemed to be insufficient to
meet the child’s need for intensive services, now Arlington and Schaffer
together may foreclose the opportunity of low-income parents of
children with ASD to pursue litigation altogether, even if their argument
is meritorious.

310. MARY WAGNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CHILDREN WE SERVE: THE
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS 37 (2002), available at http://www.seels.net/
designdocs/SEELS_Children_We_Serve_Report.pdf.
311. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2469
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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B. What Needs To Be Done Post-Arlington
1. Revision of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)
In her concurring opinion in Arlington, Justice Ginsburg explained
that the judiciary cannot rewrite the text of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 312
Rather, she emphasized that “[t]he ball . . . is properly left in Congress’
court to provide, if it so elects, for consultant fees and testing expenses
beyond those IDEA and its implementing regulations already authorize.”313
Therefore, in keeping with the overarching purpose of the IDEA to
secure every child with a disability an appropriate education at no cost to
parents, Congress should amend 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) to permit
courts, at their discretion, to award expert fees to a prevailing parent in
an IDEA-related lawsuit. Although it appears from the legislative history of
the Act that Congress intended to include expert fees as part of the
recoverable “costs” under the provision, § 1415(i)(3)(B) should still be
revised to explicitly include the phrase “expert fees” as part of those
costs. Congress should also specify the other types of recoverable costs
under this section so as to prevent any future confusion for parties
litigating over this provision regarding what the term encompasses. Not
only will this simple revision allow for clearer interpretation, it will also
substantially aid many low-income parents in their quest to obtain a
FAPE for their child.
2. Family Involvement
Children with ASD present special challenges for their parents and for
the school district. Parents dream for their child to have a healthy,
normal lifestyle. When learning that a developmental disorder might
prevent their son or daughter from achieving that high quality of life
they envisioned, they seek out the best therapy available. This places a
heavy burden on school professionals who are charged with the
responsibility of selecting a treatment or intervention option that will
produce positive outcomes for the child and will satisfy the concerns of
the parents. However, even with the IDEA mandate requiring parental
involvement in the IEP process, many school districts have lost hearings
involving children with ASD because they did not allow meaningful
parent participation. 314 Because the child’s parents play an essential role
in the planning and implementation of support services, school districts
must include parents in all aspects of their child’s education. This
312.
313.
314.
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See supra note 190.
Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Iovannone et al., supra note 36, at 161.
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includes ensuring that there are no delays in responding to the parents’
requests to evaluate their child, conducting the evaluation, developing an
appropriate IEP, and implementing the IEP. 315 If the school district
actively works to keep the lines of communication open between the
parents and the other members of the child’s IEP team, this will yield a
stronger relationship among the parties that is built on trust and
confidence. Moreover, it is likely that less dissatisfaction will result on
behalf of the parents because they will be aware of the services afforded
to their child, the progress he or she is—or is not—making, and how
they can effectively address any of their concerns. This, in turn, will
minimize the number of lawsuits brought against the school district by
unhappy parents who seek to contest the appropriateness of their child’s
IEP, and there will be less of a concern regarding the inability to recover
expert fees.
3. Highly Qualified and Well-Trained School Personnel
To ensure that the child with ASD is receiving an appropriate
individualized education, the school district must employ professionals
with expertise in the area of autism to conduct comprehensive evaluations
and carry out effective intervention programs. In doing so, the school
district must establish that its special education teachers who teach core
academic subjects 316 meet the “highly qualified” teacher standards set
forth in the 2004 Reauthorization of the IDEA.317 These standards require
the teacher to have obtained full state certification as a special education
teacher or have passed the state special education licensing examination
and hold a license to teach in the given state as a special education
teacher. 318 The teacher must also hold at least a bachelor’s degree, and
he or she must not have had a special education certification or licensure
requirement waived on an emergency, provisional, or temporary basis.319
315. Yell et al., supra note 35, at 187.
316. Core subjects include English, reading or language arts, mathematics, science,
foreign languages, civics and government, economics, arts, history, and geography.
317. 34 C.F.R. § 300.18(a)–(h) (2007). Also note that Congress intended to align
the IDEA with the No Child Left Behind Act by instituting new changes in the 2004
Reauthorization. Some of these changes include the adoption of the “highly qualified”
teacher standards from the No Child Left Behind Act with some slight modifications.
318. Id. § 300.18(b)(1)(i).
319. Id. § 300.18(b)(1)(ii)–(iii). For charter schools, “highly qualified” means that
the teacher meets the certification or licensing requirements provided for in the state’s
public charter school law. Id. § 300.18(b)(1)(i).
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However, if the teacher is only providing consultative or collaborative
support to a “highly qualified” teacher, he or she does not need full state
certification. Rather the special educator must have at least obtained a
bachelor’s degree 320 and must be receiving “high-quality professional
development that is sustained, intensive, and classroom-focused,” 321
participating in an intensive supervision program, 322 carrying out the
functions of the teacher for a specified period of time that does not
exceed three years, 323 and showing satisfactory progress toward
obtaining state certification. 324 If a school district complies with these
requirements, fewer substantive and procedural violations will occur and
the district’s personnel will be well equipped to create and facilitate
appropriate educational programs for children with ASD.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision of Arlington Central School District v.
Murphy stands in the way of many parents who seek to challenge the
school district’s IEP for their disabled child. Foreclosing the award of
expert fees to prevailing parents in an IDEA suit may categorically
remove low-income parents from the due process scheme because they
cannot fund an expert. This is especially troubling for parents of children
with ASD who require an expert to assess the behavioral and communicative
complexities their child possesses and to determine whether the school
district has developed an appropriate IEP to meet their child’s
individualized needs. Therefore, it is imperative that Congress revise
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) to specify the inclusion of expert fees as part
of the recoverable costs. In doing so, Congress will not only preserve
the IDEA’s fundamental goal of protecting the right of disabled children
to a FAPE, but it will also ensure that parents are better equipped with
“the firepower to meet the opposition” when advocating for their child. 325

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
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Id. § 300.18(b)(3).
Id. § 300.18(b)(2)(i)(A).
Id. § 300.18(b)(2)(i)(B).
Id. § 300.18(b)(2)(i)(C).
Id. § 300.18(b)(2)(i)(D).
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 61 (2005).
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